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Numerous dysfunctions plague the current system of campaigns and
threaten the proper operation of the democratic process in the United States.
The cost of mounting a campaign with any chance of success has risen
dramatically over the past thirty years, largely driven by the skyrocketing costs
of political advertising on broadcast television stations. These advertisements
are the primary means through which candidates communicate with voters,
particularly as broadcast stations consistently reduce the amount of free news
coverage they offer candidates and campaigns. The ever-increasing cost of the
most widely used tool for communicating with voters has a powerfully harmful
effect on the healthy operation of the democratic process: Challengers, who
typically have access to less fundraising resources than incumbents unless they
are personally wealthy, often cannot raise sufficient funds to purchase the
amount of advertising necessary to mount an effective campaign.
Consequently, voters receive less of the information they require to be aware of
candidates, evaluate them, and make informed decisions. Voters are left
without a choice-either in effect, because challengers do not have enough
resources to make voters aware of their candidacies and ideas, or in fact,
because potential challengers are deterred from even entering a race as a result
of their lack of resources.'
Over the years, presidents, members of Congress, commentators, and others
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1. The McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform measure, recently upheld by the Supreme Court,
does very little to address these problems. Its focus on limiting both the amount of "soft money" that
candidates can raise and the amount that outside groups can spend on certain forms of advertising does
not empower challengers to compete effectively against incumbents, who ultimately remain advantaged
under the new campaign finance system. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Conspiracy Of Silence, AM. LAW.,
Oct. 1, 2002, at 69, 69 (describing McCain-Feingold as "an incumbent-protection provision, pure and
simple"); Stuart Taylor, Jr., More Rules for Democracy, LEGAL TIMEs, Dec. 15, 2003, at 60 (noting
"McCain-Feingold probably reduces challengers' already-slim chances of defeating incumbents, whose
natural advantages loom larger as party money becomes scarcer.")
Yale Law & Policy Review
have developed several proposals to address the information and competition
deficits in campaigns by giving candidates "free air time." However, all of
these plans have contained fundamental design flaws that undermine their
effectiveness. For instance, in order to promote a particular type of campaign
discourse, many proposals would only give candidates free broadcast time in
certain forms, such as five- or thirty-minute blocks, or would limit use of the
time to certain kinds of messages, such as live presentations by the candidates
of their positions. By forcing candidates to engage in only a certain form or
kind of advertising, these proposals would hamstring candidates' ability to
compete in the marketplace of ideas and discourage them from considering
non-traditional approaches to communicating with voters. Other proposals have
relied on exhortations to broadcasters to voluntarily provide candidates with
free air time, despite the clear tendency of profit-motivated broadcasters both to
exploit loopholes in current laws designed to guarantee candidates low-cost
access to the airwaves and to devote fewer and fewer resources to free
campaign coverage.
Most importantly, these proposals have almost uniformly focused on the
provision of free broadcast advertising time, particularly broadcast television
advertising time. While broadcast advertising undoubtedly plays a key role in
campaigns, other media, in particular the Internet and cable television, can be
equally, if not more, valuable to many candidates. By providing candidates
with only broadcast time, these proposals have failed to recognize the disparate
needs of various candidates-depending on which office they seek and their
geographic location-and the tremendous potential of other media to address
the lack of information and competitiveness in today's campaigns.
In order to avoid the flaws of prior proposals and to create an approach that
can achieve real change, an effective plan must give candidates the utmost
flexibility to use the types of media that best meet their needs in the ways that
they find most efficacious, while also encouraging them to use nontraditional
media particularly well-suited for increasing competition and the exchange of
information. This Note offers a comprehensive political media subsidization
and reform plan that accomplishes those goals. Utilizing funds raised through
the imposition of a spectrum use fee on broadcasters, this Proposal offers
federal candidates resources to spend on any type of advertising or promotional
activity they want. Unlike other plans, the Note's Proposal does not limit its
subsidies to broadcast television advertising, but rather allows candidates to
spend the money on radio, cable, billboards, direct mail, flyers, or the Internet.
As a means to encourage candidates to make better use of the Internet in
particular, the unique characteristics of which are especially conducive to
increasing the amount of campaign information and the quantity and quality of
candidate-voter interaction, the Proposal also offers candidates additional funds
to be spent exclusively on online campaign activities. In addition, the Proposal
Vol. 22:351, 2004
Free Air Time
maximizes the value of the subsidies allocated both by reforming the lowest
unit charge rule and by extending the reasonable access rule, which guarantees
candidates the ability to buy advertising time, to cable. The various aspects of
the Proposal, all of which would survive constitutional scrutiny, serve to
increase the dissemination of information that voters need to make informed
decisions about candidates and to reintroduce meaningful competition into
elections.
Part II of this paper examines the role that the current law, through its
numerous loopholes, and the media, through its advertising and news coverage
policies, play in creating the current dysfunctions in the campaign system. Part
III reviews previous free air time proposals and examines their strengths and
weaknesses. Drawing upon that analysis, Part IV presents this Note's Proposal,
which incorporates the best elements of earlier plans while adding novel
features that substantially increase its relevance to the modem media
environment. Part V explains the importance of one of the plan's key
innovations-providing incentives to use non-traditional media-and
demonstrates how it both increases the dissemination of campaign information
and enhances meaningful competition in elections. Finally, Part VI reviews the
legal issues surrounding the Proposal and explains why it is constitutional.
II. THE PROBLEM: THE ROLE OF LAW AND MEDIA POLICY IN CREATING
DYSFUNCTIONS IN TODAY'S DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
Candidates' reliance on television advertising, particularly broadcast
television advertising, has created a dynamic which inhibits the dissemination
of information necessary for voters to make informed electoral decisions and
contributes to a lack of meaningful competition between candidates. The rising
use of television advertising has fueled the skyrocketing costs of campaigns. As
television advertising has become an increasingly large expense in campaigns,
government measures designed to guarantee candidates reasonably priced air
time have become less and less effective. While television stations are reaping
large amounts of revenue from the abundance of candidate advertising, they are
reducing their free coverage of the campaigns. The combination of the high
costs of communication and lack of free coverage creates large barriers of entry
to challengers who cannot self-finance their campaigns and makes
communication difficult for those non-wealthy challengers who do enter
campaigns. Thus, in many of today's campaigns, voters often receive
information only from incumbents or not at all-without viable challengers,
many incumbents see little reason to engage in all but perfunctory
campaigning. The result of this dynamic is less informative and less
competitive campaigns, which essentially undermines the democratic process
by denying voters the opportunity to make informed decisions between at least
two candidates. This Note's Proposal for a comprehensive political media
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subsidization and reform policy addresses these problems in an effort to
facilitate the exchange of diverse ideas in, and reintroduce meaningful
competition to, campaigns.
A. Reliance on Television Advertising Has Fueled the Skyrocketing Costs of
Campaigns
Candidate spending on television advertising has dramatically increased
over the last thirty years. In 1972, all local, state, and federal candidates, in
both primary and general elections, spent $24.6 million on television
advertising. 2 That figure reached $50.8 million in 1976 and $400 million in
1996. 3 Even when adjusted for inflation, the total amount spent on television
advertising increased over 300 percent during the six presidential cycles from
1972 until 1996. In the last few election cycles, spending on television
advertising grew at an exponential rate. The total spending on political
television advertisements in 2000 amounted to more than $623 million4 and
reached a record high of slightly below $1 billion in the 2002 election cycle.5
These dramatic increases in spending on televised political advertisements
constitute one of the main reasons for the overall rise in campaign spending. As
the Committee for Economic Development stated, "The primary factor driving
higher campaign spending has been the cost of television and other forms of
advertising." 6 This echoes the view of academics who study elections7 and the
experiences of recent candidates who spend more and more of their resources
on advertising. In competitive races for all federal offices and governorships in
2000, expenses for television advertising amounted to more than 50 percent of
total campaign spending. 8 In sum, the past thirty years have seen a dramatic
2. JOSEPH E. CANTOR ET AL., FREE AND REDUCED-RATE TELEVISION TIME FOR POLITICAL
CANDIDATES 5 (Cong. Research Serv., Rep. No. 97-680, 1997).
3. Id.
4. These findings come from the Wisconsin Advertising Project, an ongoing study of political
television advertising at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Press Release, Wis. Adver. Project,
Political Advertising Nearly Tripled in 2000 with Half-A-Million More TV Ads (Mar. 14, 2001),
http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/tvadvertising/Press-Releases/Press-Release-PDFs/Release%202001%20M
arch%2014th.pdf.
5. Press Release, Wis. Adver. Project, One Billion Dollars Spent on Political Television
Advertising in 2002 Midterm Elections (Dec. 5, 2002), http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/
tvadvertising/Press Releases/Press-Release-PDFs/Release%202002%2December%25th.pdf.
6. COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., INVESTING IN THE PEOPLE'S BUSINESS: A BUSINESS PROPOSAL FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 9 (1999), available at http://www.ced.org/docs/report/report-cfr.pdf.
7. See, e.g., GARY C. JACOBSEN, THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 68 (4th ed. 1997)
("The feeling that television advertising is essential regaidless of price is one important force driving up
the cost of campaigning."); DAVID B. MAGLEBY & CANDICE J. NELSON, THE MONEY CHASE 27 (1990)
("Much of the increase in [campaign] spending has been caused by the high cost of modem
communications.").
8. PAUL TAYLOR & NORMAN ORNSTEIN, THE CASE FOR FREE AIR TIME: A BROADCAST SPECTRUM
FEE FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 10 (New America Foundation, Spectrum Series Issue Brief No.
4, 2002), available at http://www.newamerica.net/Download-Docs/pdfs/PubFile_894_1.pdf.
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increase in campaign spending, much of it due to expenditures on television
advertising.
B. The Lowest Unit Charge Rule Essentially Offers Candidates No Protection
The ever-increasing amount spent on televised political advertising results
in part from the failure of a government program designed to guarantee low-
cost television advertising time to candidates. In 1971, Congress passed the
"lowest unit charge" rule, which requires broadcast television stations, as a
condition of receiving their licenses, to offer candidates a rate for advertising
time that is no higher than the lowest rate it charges any other advertiser for the
same type of advertising at the same time. 9 By enacting this law, Congress
intended to provide candidates with greater access to the media and combat the
increasing costs of campaigns by preventing stations from charging candidates
any more than the rates offered to the most-favored commercial advertisers.'
0
However, the law contains a loophole that eviscerates its protections. Many
commercial advertisers buy what is known as "preemptible time," which
provides them no assurance that their advertisements will run at a particular
time. If an advertiser buys preemptible time and the television station
subsequently receives a better offer from another advertiser, the station can
delay broadcasting the first advertisement." Candidates, though, possess
special needs as advertisers. Because campaigns only last for a limited time and
circumstances and events change rapidly during that period, candidates need
assurances that their advertisements will run at an exact time and during an
exact program. For instance, if a candidate buys a thirty-second advertisement
during Friends the week before Election Day, she requires that advertisement
to air that night-and not on the Friends episode that airs the next week, after
the election has passed. As a result, candidates must buy "non-preemptible"
time, for which stations charge much higher rates.' 2 The lowest unit charge rule
does not prevent such practices because commercial advertisers generally do
not buy "non-preemptible" time and thus do not set a lowest unit charge rate for
9. 47 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2000).
10. Codification of the Commission's Political Programming Policies, 7 F.C.C.R. 678, 687 (1991)
(quoting S. REP. No. 92-96 (1971)). The law also requires that broadcast stations provide "reasonable
access" to candidates by permitting them to purchase "reasonable" amounts of advertising time. 47
U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (2000).
11. The Federal Communication Commission noted this problem in 1988. See Licensees and Cable
Operators Reminded of Lowest Charge Obligations, 4 F.C.C.R. 3823, 3823 (1998) ("Preemptibility
enables the broadcaster to 'bump' an advertiser paying a lower preemptible rate in favor of an advertiser
paying a higher preemptible rate .... Since both advertisers knew the spots they purchased were
preemptible, no reason must be given by the broadcaster for a preemption.").
12. Id. ("[Non-preemptible] rates are higher than prevailing preemptible rates because they
guarantee the airing of a spot at a particular time .... To avoid the vagaries of preemption, political
candidates often choose to pay the higher non-preemptible rate.").
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candidates. 13
The U.S. Senate moved to address this problem in March 2001. By a vote
of sixty-nine to thirty-one, it approved the Torricelli Amendment to the
McCain-Feingold campaign finance bill. 14 This amendment would have
permitted candidates to buy "non-preemptible" time at the lower "preemptible"
rates charged most commercial advertisers. However, after extensive lobbying
by the broadcast industry, the provision was not included in the Shays-Meehan
campaign finance bill approved by the House of Representatives and was
dropped from the bill reported out of the House-Senate conference." As a
result, the existing system essentially remains unchanged. 16
Furthermore, the already high "non-preemptible" rates were driven even
higher during recent campaigns as political parties and outside interest groups
increasingly utilized "soft money" to buy advertising time. In 1998, political
parties and interest groups ran only 66,586 advertisements. Two years later,
they ran 409,496 advertisements.! 7 Because of this increased demand, the cost
of even "non-preemptible" time has risen dramatically. In 2000, the Center for
the Study of Elections and Democracy at Brigham Young University conducted
a study of seventeen media markets across the country that were home to
competitive congressional and senatorial races. It found that from the end of
August to the end of October, the cost of a thirty-second political advertisement
tripled. In non-election years, advertising prices during the same period
increased by approximately twenty percent. 18 This discrepancy indicates that
"virtually all of the price spike in those markets in the fall of 2000 resulted
from stations profiteering on the election-driven demand."' 19 Therefore, not
only do candidates have to pay the exorbitant "non-preemptible" rate for
television advertising time, but the cost of such time is also being driven ever
higher by non-candidate advertisers. 20 The protections offered by the lowest
13. TAYLOR & ORNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 11.
14. S. Amend. 122 to S. 27, 107th Cong. (2001). See also 147 CONG. REC. S2603-19 (daily ed.
Mar. 21, 2001) (Senate debate on Torricelli Amendment).
15. TAYLOR & ORNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 11.
16. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 does contain two provisions relating to
the lowest unit charge. One denies candidates the lowest unit charge unless they promise not to refer to
other candidates in their advertisements. Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 305, 116 Stat. 81, 100-03 (2002).
Another requires radio and television broadcasting stations to maintain records of requests to purchase
advertising time, whether by candidates or by others who want to air advertisements on political matters.
These records must include the rate charged for the time and be open to the public. Pub. L. No. 107-155,
§ 504, 116 Stat. 81, 115-16 (2002). Nonetheless, neither of these provisions in BCRA addresses the
underlying problems in the existing lowest unit charge system.
17. Press Release, supra note 4.
18. TAYLOR & ORNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 10.
19. ALLIANCE FOR BETTER CAMPAIGNS, GOUGING DEMOCRACY (2001), at
http://www.bettercampaigns.org/reports/display.php?PagelD=37.
20. Campaign finance reform recently enacted by Congress largely curtails the abilities of parties
and outside groups to fund these advertisements. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
197-55, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.). While these measures were
Vol. 22:351, 2004
Free Air Time
unit charge rule offer candidates little protection from this price gouging.
Although this combination of circumstances creates hardships for
candidates, it generates a windfall for local broadcast stations. Instead of
considering the provision of reasonably priced air time to candidates as part of
their public interest obligations, broadcast television stations view political
advertising as a way to pad their bottom lines.2' As noted above, candidates
spent approximately $1 billion on televised political advertisements in the 2002
election cycle.22 Media companies that own television stations increasingly rely
on this money as a key source of revenue, particularly in the face of an
otherwise weak advertising market. Many of the largest broadcast television
station ownership groups-which also own numerous print and cable television
outlets-attributed their revenue growth in the latter part of 2002 to political
23 2advertisements, including Gannett, the Washington Post Company,24 and
Hearst-Argyle. 25 When Congress enacted existing laws regarding candidate
access to broadcast television, it did so to ensure that candidates would not be
shut out of television access. However, instead of denying candidates access,
television stations now eagerly embrace candidate advertising-as a way to
increase their profits by circumventing the spirit of the lowest unit charge rule.
C. The Reduction in Free Coverage Fuels Candidates' Demand for
Advertising
Broadcast television stations contribute to the problem of advertisement
costs not only by exploiting candidates' unique requirements as advertisers, but
also by increasing candidates' need for the advertising time. Local stations have
driven up demand for paid advertising time by severely cutting back on the
recently upheld by the Supreme Court, the law still contains loopholes which allow supposedly
independent groups, known as 527s, to raise and spend unlimited amounts of money on campaign-
related commercials. See Glen Justice, Kerry and Democratic Groups Accused of Finance Violations,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2004, at A20 ("527 committees, named for the section of the tax code that created
them.., collect unlimited 'soft money' contributions from companies, labor unions and wealthy
individuals and use that money to finance advertisements, voter mobilization drives and other election
efforts."). This spending by 527s will undoubtedly fuel the rising prices of non-preemptible advertising
time in 2004 and future election cycles.
21. See Mark K. Miller & Dan Trigoboff, Calm Before the Storm, BROADCAST & CABLE, Apr. 7,
2003, at 27.
22. Press Release, supra note 5.
23. Frank Ahrens, Gannett Gains Reflect Rebound in Media Sector, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2003, at
E3 ("Gannett Co. yesterday reported revenue and profit increases for both the fourth quarter and all of
2002 .... Gannett attributed the gains to a surfeit of political advertising at its television stations....
(emphasis added)).
24. Post Revenue Rises in Fourth Quarter, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Jan. 25, 2003, at El ("Fourth-
quarter revenue rose 14 percent at the [Washington Post Co.] TV broadcasting division to $100.0
million, due primarily to $20.1 million in political advertising." (emphasis added)).
25. Andrei Postelnicu, Stocks See Only Limited Boost from Jobs Data, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb.
8, 2003, at 20 ("Hearst-Argyle, a television station owner and management company, reported higher
earnings for the fourth quarter thanks to revenue from political advertising in the midterm elections."
(emphasis added)).
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amount of free coverage they devote to candidates and political events. In 2000,
the three networks offering nightly newscasts-ABC, CBS, and NBC-spent
forty-three percent less time than in 1992 and twenty-eight percent less time
than in 1988, the last incumbent-free contest, covering the presidential
26campaign. Even this small amount of coverage allowed little time for
candidates to communicate directly to the public. Communication by anchors
or reporters accounted for seventy-four percent of this campaign coverage; only
twelve percent involved candidates themselves speaking. 27 This reflects a
historical trend toward limiting the amount of time news programs devote to
candidate speech. The average length of a candidate sound bite on the network
evening news declined from over forty-three seconds in 1968 to fewer than
nine seconds in 1988. 28 In 2000, the average length of a candidate sound bite
continued to decline to 7.8 seconds. 29 As a means of comparison, the length of
time George W. Bush appeared on one episode of The Late Show with David
Letterman in October 2000, thirteen minutes, exceeded the amount of speaking
time he received from the three network nightly newscasts combined in the
month of October.
30
Furthermore, this minimal amount of news coverage focuses largely on the
"horserace" aspects of the campaign-not on substantive issues. According to
the Annenberg Public Policy Center, only about twenty-five percent of the
stories aired by the network newscasts before either the primary or general
election in 2000 included candidate-centered discourse; the balance of the
stories focused on campaign strategy and the relative standing of the candidates
vis-d-vis one another.31 Local broadcast stations' coverage of the campaign was
not any better. A study conducted by the Lear Center of the news coverage of
local broadcast stations in 2000 found that twenty-four percent of the stories
aired in the last thirty days before the general election were issue-based;
strategy-focused stories accounted for most of the balance. 32
Other types of campaign coverage, including the airing of debates and
conventions, fared no better on broadcast television stations. The most recent
26. Center for Media and Public Affairs, How TV News Covered the General Election Campaign,
MEDIA MONITOR, Nov./Dec. 2000, available at http://209.238.249.38iMediamon/mml 11200.htm.
27. Id. The remaining fourteen percent of time involved communication by all other sources,
including pundits, voters, and campaign staffers. Id.
28. Daniel C. Hallin, Sound Bite News: Television Coverage of Elections, 1968-1988, J. COMM.,
Spring 1992, at 5, 5-6.
29. Center for Media and Public Affairs, supra note 26.
30. Id.
31. ERIKA FALK & SEAN ADAY, ANNENBERG PUB. POLICY CTR., ARE VOLUNTARY STANDARDS
WORKING?: CANDIDATE DISCOURSE ON NETWORK EVENING NEWS PROGRAMS 5 (2000), available at
http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/03_political-communication/freetime/2000-
voluntary/o20standards%20report.pdf.
32. MARTIN KAPLAN & MATTHEW HALE, NORMAN LEAR CTR., LOCAL TV COVERAGE OF THE
2000 GENERAL ELECTION 10 (2001), available at http://www.learcenter.org/pdf/campaignnews.pdf.
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presidential campaign marked a watershed in broadcast television's coverage of
debates. Instead of covering the third presidential debate between Al Gore and
George W. Bush, NBC offered its stations the option of broadcasting a baseball
playoff game and Fox ran a dramatic show. 3 3 Until that year, all the major
networks always had carried the presidential debates in prime time.34 Broadcast
television stations also reduced their coverage of the national political
conventions. In 1976, the three major networks offered over fifty hours of
convention coverage; by 1996, that number dropped to twelve hours. 35 In 2000,
the networks covered ten-and-a-half hours of the Democratic National
Convention and about seven-and-a-half hours of the Republican National
Convention.
36
This overall decline in campaign coverage has created a troublesome
dynamic. As broadcast television stations offer less free news coverage of
elections, candidates become increasingly reliant on paid political advertising
to reach the large audience accessible only through broadcast television
stations. Thus, broadcast television stations reap the economic rewards of the
large demand for advertising time created, in part, by the shirking of their
public interest responsibilities to cover campaigns and provide voters with the
information they need to make informed decisions within the democratic
process.
D. The Costs of Campaigns and Limits in Free Coverage Create Large
Barriers to Entry for Challengers
The increasing cost of political campaigns and the decreasing ability of
candidates to communicate their messages through free media combine to
create a huge barrier of entry for challengers. 37 Without sufficient resources, a
challenger possesses few means for communicating with voters-to make
voters aware of her existence and her ideas-and thus cannot hope to compete
effectively against incumbents who face little difficulty communicating with
voters because they inevitably can access sizable amounts of resources to pay
for their advertising. This resource-access disparity, which largely dictates the
varying abilities of candidates to advertise, often deters quality challengers
33. PoliticalAlmanac, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 19, 2000, at A18.
34. John McCaslin, Inside the Beltway, WASH. TIMES, June 14, 2002, at A6.
35. THOMAS PATrERSON, JOAN SHORENSTEIN CTR. PRESS, POLITICS, & PUBLIC POL'Y, IS THERE A
FUTURE FOR ON-THE-AIR TELEVISED CONVENTIONS? 1 (2000), available at
http://www.ksg.harvard.eduipresspol/ResearchPublications/Reports/conventioncoverage.pdf.
36. Tim Cuprisin, Democrats Got More TV Time than GOP, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 22,
2000, at 6B.
37. See Free Speech and Campaign Finance Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 39 (1997) (statement of Rep. Richard
Gephardt); Reed E. Hundt, The Public's Airwaves: What Does the Public Interest Require of Television
Broadcasters?, 45 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1100 (1996) ("The cost of television advertising makes fundraising
an enormous entry barrier for candidates seeking public office .... ").
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from entering a race.38
As a result, those who can afford to self-finance their campaigns are
increasingly the only individuals who mount effective challenges to
incumbents. The amount of self-financed money spent by Senate candidates
rose from five percent in 1988 to eleven percent in 1998. 39 This increase cannot
be attributed to the spending of a few wealthy candidates-many more
candidates are financing large portions, if not all, of their campaigns. In 1998,
eighteen Senate candidates and sixty-nine House candidates contributed at least
$100,000 to their campaigns. 40 Furthermore, self-financing occurs almost
exclusively when an individual is challenging an incumbent or running for an
open seat. In elections from 1988 to 1998, congressional incumbents raised
only 1.6 percent of their campaigns funds through self-financing. 41 Although
one Senate and two House incumbents contributed at least $100,000 to their
campaigns in 1998, challengers and open-seat candidates for House and Senate
seats raised twenty-three percent and seventeen percent, respectively, of their
funds through self-financing. 42 The fact that, once in office, even wealthy
challengers encounter no trouble in raising money from outside sources
indicates the strong relationship between incumbency and access to funds.43
Consequently, the current system inhibits competition in federal elections,
particularly by non-wealthy candidates. The need for money to buy television
advertising, created in part by the severe reduction in television stations' news
coverage of candidates and campaigns, fuels the dramatically rising cost of
campaigns, which in turn necessitates ever increasing fundraising efforts.
Incumbents typically possess a massive fundraising advantage over any
challengers, which often deters people from even entering a campaign. Even
when there is no incumbent in the race, the ability of "millionaire" candidates
to fund their campaigns makes it difficult for non-wealthy candidates to get
their voices heard. As a result, the realities of today's elections, shaped by the
demands of televised political advertising, must be addressed in order to
increase the dissemination of information voters require to make decisions in
campaigns and reintroduce meaningful competition into races.
38. See, e.g., Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, A Dynamic Analysis of the Role of War Chests in
Campaign Strategy, 40 AM. J. POL. Sci. 352 (1996).
39. COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 6, at 18.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 18-19.
43. The greater ease that incumbents enjoy in raising money stems from a number of sources: their
ability to favor or disfavor donors, their high level of name recognition, their continuous contact with
constituents over their terms, the service they provide their constituents, and their generally greater
likelihood of winning. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW
PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE 19, 38, 156-58 (2002); see also Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss
Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM. L.
REv. 1126, 1134-36 (1994).
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III. THE PAST: PREVIOUS FREE AIR TIME PROPOSALS
A. The Evolution of Free Air Time Proposals
Over the years, elected officials, regulators, and other interested parties
have offered a range of free or reduced-price air time proposals to address the
problems described above. In 1966, FCC Chairman E. William Henry
suggested the first explicit proposal for free air time. Under his plan, a station
that sold any time to a candidate would have to distribute an equivalent amount
of free time among all the major candidates in the race. For example, if it were
a two candidate race and one candidate bought one hour from a particular
station, then the station would have to equally distribute an hour of free air time
between the competitors in the race by giving one half-hour to the original
candidate and one half-hour to his opponent. Foreshadowing much of the
current debate over free air time, Henry's suggestion encountered widespread
opposition and was never implemented. 4
Over twenty years later, in 1987, two congressmen introduced separate bills
which would have provided for different versions of free air time.
Representative Samuel Stratton's proposal would have offered all presidential
and congressional candidates free air time in the thirty days before a general
election. His bill required that seventy-five percent of the free time come
45during prime-time viewing hours. Representative Andrew Jacobs proposed a
bill that would have granted public financing of broadcast and newspaper
advertising to candidates who did not accept money from political action
committees. Neither of these bills made it out of committee.46
The next year, Senator Mitch McConnell, ironically one of the most
committed opponents to the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform
legislation, proposed discounted (but not free) time for candidates as well as
requirements that candidates have the option to buy nonpreemptible time. His
bill died in committee. 47 Also in 1988, then-Senator Al Gore, Jr. offered his
own free air time legislation, which directed the FCC chairman to issue rules
requiring all television and radio broadcasters each to provide six-and-one-half
hours of free time to the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates
48during the eight weeks before an election. The bill died in committee.
44. See Glenda C. Williams, Pleading the Fifth: Media Economics, Free Air Time, and the Fifth
Amendment, 6 COMM. L. & POL'Y 319, 321-322 (2001).
45. Id. at 322.
46. Id.
47. S. 2627, 100th Cong. (1988), cited in Williams, supra note 44, at 322.
48. S. 2923, 100th Cong. (1988), cited in Williams, supra note 44, at 322. Notably, in 1968,
Senator Gore's father had said, "The public owns the airwaves which we give the television and radio
stations permission to use, and.., we could reserve a certain percentage of time for civic purposes."
Hundt, supra note 37, at 1105.
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Two years later, in 1990, Senator William Roth introduced a free air time
measure that would have compelled the FCC to implement free air time
policies for candidates for the presidency, Senate, and House of
Representatives. His proposal contained some significant restrictions-it
required candidates to forgo the purchase of any additional advertising during
the forty-five-day period in which they received free air time and to agree "to
limit the use of the television broadcast time provided to the personal
presentation of his or her views in speeches, interviews, debates or similar
formats." The bill died at the close of the session.49 In 1991, Congress passed a
bill 5° which provided free air time vouchers, and the ability to purchase non-
51 52preemptible time, to Senate candidates. The money from those vouchers
was limited to funds received through a voluntary check-off system.
53
Nonetheless, the bill was vetoed by President Bush, and Congress did not have
the votes to override it.
54
In 1997, the Clinton Administration first confronted the issue of free air
time when President Bill Clinton convened an advisory panel-the Advisory
Committee on the Public Interest Obligations of Digital Television
Broadcasters (known as the Gore Commission)-to examine what public
interest obligations, if any, should be imposed on broadcasters in exchange for
giving them valuable spectrum space for free.55 The final report recommended
that instead of being required to provide free air time as part of their public
interest obligations, broadcast stations should voluntarily air five minutes of
candidate-centered discourse per night for the thirty days before an election
(the 5/30 standard). 6 Broadcast stations largely failed to comply with the
voluntary standards. 57 Returning to the issue in his 1998 State of the Union
Address, President Clinton declared that he would call on the FCC to provide
candidates with free air time.5 8 When then-FCC Chairman William Kennard
49. S. 2964, 101st Cong. (1990).
50. Senate Election Ethics Act of 1991, S. 3, 102d Cong. (1991). The bill as passed contained the
amendments described in infra notes 51-53.
51. S. Amend. 271 to S. 3, 102d Cong. (1991).
52. S. Amend. 242 to S. 3, 102d Cong. (1991)
53. S. Amend. 263 to S. 3, 102d Cong. (1991). A voluntary check-off system allows a taxpayer to
indicate on his income tax return that he wishes to divert a pre-set amount of the taxes he owes to a fund
which provides resources for a particular purpose. For instance, taxpayers currently can check-off a box
on their income tax return that diverts $3 of their tax liability to the Presidential Election Campaign
Fund, which pays for the existing matching funds system for presidential elections. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 6096 (2000).
54. Williams, supra note 44, at 323.
55. Exec. Order No. 13,038, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,065 (Mar. 11, 1997).
56. PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMM. ON PUB. INTEREST OBLIGATIONS OF DIGITAL TELEVISION
BROADCASTERS, CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCAST FUTURE 59 (1998), available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/pubintadvcom/piacreport.pdf.
57. See infra Subsection III.C.4.
58. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 34 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc, 129, 136 (Jan. 27, 1998) ("[W]e have to address the real reason for the explosion in
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said he intended to move forward on President Clinton's call to action,
members of Congress and broadcasters heavily attacked him. In the face of
threats from Congress that they would cut the FCC's budget if he continued to
pursue the issue, Kennard eventually dropped proposed rulemaking on free air
time.
Over the years that followed, Senators McCain and Feingold continued the
fight for free air time for political candidates. Their Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act (better known as McCain-Feingold) originally contained a
proposal addressing the spiraling costs of television in presidential campaigns,
but they removed this provision because they felt its inclusion threatened final
passage of the Act.60 Recently, they joined with Senator Durbin to propose the
Political Campaign Broadcast Activity Improvements Act.6 1 The legislation
contains a number of meritorious, if not entirely ideal, features, including the
following three important provisions:
First, the proposed Act would create a voucher program for federal
candidates to acquire air time on broadcast or radio stations.62 The Act sets
the total cost of the voucher program at $750 million for the 2004 election,
which is indexed to increase at the pace of inflation in subsequent election
years.63 In order to fund the program, a spectrum use fee of not less than
0.5% and not more than 1% would be assessed on the gross annual revenues
of all spectrum license holders. 64 To qualify for the vouchers, candidates
would be required to meet fundraising goals based on the office they seek
through small donations. 65 If candidates qualified, the value of the vouchers
campaign costs: the high cost of media advertising.... I will formally request that the Federal
Communications Commission act to provide free or reduced-cost television time for candidates who
observe spending limits voluntarily. The airwaves are a public trust, and broadcasters also have to help
us in this effort to strengthen our democracy.").
59. See Charles Lewis, Media Money, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv., Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 20, 20; see
also Kathy Chen, Issue of TVAir Time for Public Affairs Is Raised Anew, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 1999, at
B4.
60. Williams, supra note 44, at 326-27.
61. S. 3124, 107th Cong. (2002). The sponsoring senators developed this bill in close consultation
with Paul Taylor and Norman Omstein, two of the nation's leading advocates of free air time. The
PCBAIA failed to make it out of committee in the 107th Congress, but the senators reintroduced it in the
108th Congress with a new title, the "Our Democracy, Our Airwaves Act of 2003." S. 1497, 108th
Cong. (2003).
62. Id. sec. 4(a).
63. Id. sec 4(a), § 315A(d)-(e).
64. Id. sec. 4(a), § 315A(h)(2). Some commentators have suggested that all of broadcast stations'
public interest obligations should be replaced by a flat five percent spectrum fee, but this is an ill-
advised proposal. See infra note 180.
65. In order to be eligible to receive money from under this legislation, a candidate for the U.S.
House of Representatives must raise $25,000 in contributions of no more than $250 each from
individuals. Any money over $250 donated by an individual will not count toward the qualifying total.
Thus, if an individual donates $2,000, the maximum allowed under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act, only $250 of that donation will count towards the $25,000 necessary for a candidate to qualify for
the vouchers. Furthermore, the candidate must face at least one opponent who has raised or spent a
minimum of $25,000 on that campaign to qualify for voucher allocations. S. 3124 sec. 4(a),
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that they would receive would be based on how much money they raised
according the to Act's rules, subject to maximum limits.66
" Second, the Act would amend the lowest unit charge rules contained in the
Communications Act of 1934. The lowest unit charge would remain in
effect, but it would no longer be based on the price charged by a station for
the same class and amount of time for the same period during the forty-five
days preceding a primary election and the sixty days preceding the date of a
general or special election. Instead, it would be based on the lowest unit
charge the station had given to any advertisers for the same class and
amount of time during the 120 days before the use by the candidate or party.
Furthermore, the proposal would prohibit stations from preempting the
advertisements purchased by candidates, even if they bought "preemptible"-
priced air time, except in circumstances beyond a station's control. 67
" Third, the Act would require that television and radio broadcast stations air
at least two hours of candidate-centered or issue-centered programming
each week during the six weeks preceding a federal election. No less than
one of those hours each week must occur between the hours of 5:00 p.m.
68and 11:35 p.m. (local time).
These proposals-coming from presidents, senators, congressmen, and
agency officials-are each valuable for advancing our thinking about free air
time issues. However, each also contains flaws that would undermine its
effectiveness. The following two Sections outline the strengths and weaknesses
contained in various proposals; the subsequent Part draws upon these lessons to
formulate a superior approach to free air time.
§ 315A(b)(2)(C). For a candidate for the U.S. Senate to qualify, he must raise $25,000 from individuals,
not including any money beyond $250 received from any single individual, multiplied by the number of
U.S. representatives in the state in which the Senate candidate seeks election. For instance, a Senate
candidate in Maryland, which has eight U.S. representatives, must raise $200,000 to qualify for Trust
Fund money. Moreover, the candidate must face at least one opponent who has raised or spent a
minimum of $25,000 on that campaign, multiplied by the number of U.S. representatives from that state.
Id. sec 4(a), § 315A(b)(2)(D). Presidential candidates will qualify for voucher money in the same
manner in which they qualify to receive partial public financing for their primary election campaigns
and full public financing for their general election campaigns. Id. sec 4(a), § 315A(b)(2)(E). Under this
legislation, national political parties can also qualify for a certain amount of free air time. Id. sec. 4(a),
§ 315A(c).
66. Upon qualification, House and Senate candidates will receive $3 from the Trust Fund for every
$1 they receive as contributions from individuals, not including any money beyond $250 received from
any individual. Id. sec. 4(a), § 315A(d)(2)(A). House candidates' allotment from the general-use portion
of the Trust Fund cannot exceed $375,000 for the cycle; Senate candidates' take cannot exceed
$375,000 multiplied by the number of U.S. representatives in the state in which they seek election. Id.
sec. 4(a), § 315A(d)(2)(B). In a primary campaign, presidential candidates will receive $1 from the
general-use portion of the Trust Fund for every $1 they receive in federal matching funds; in a general
election campaign, presidential candidates will receive fifty cents for every $1 they receive in federal
matching funds. Id. sec. 4(a), § 315A(d)(2)(C).
67. Id. § 2(a)(2), (d).
68. Id. § 3.
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B. Strengths of Past Proposals
The goal of all free air time proposals is to reduce the role of money in
elections and allow candidates with less resources than either incumbents or
those that can self-finance their campaigns to compete more effectively. An
effective way of accomplishing these goals, which some of the previously
offered plans adopt, is providing qualifying federal candidates with a certain
minimum amount (or "floor") of resources that they can use in their campaigns.
The best of these plans also recognize that providing candidates resources is not
sufficient to guarantee their usefulness. Instead, an effective free air time plan
also requires addressing the fundamental flaws in existing laws that are
intended but fail to secure candidates' ability to purchase low-cost advertising
on broadcast stations.
1. Creating a Floor of Resources to Increase Competitiveness of
Elections
One strength of some of the proposals, including the Political Campaign
Broadcast Activity Improvements Act, involves their provision of a "floor" of
resources to candidates. Some critics may dismiss the impact of such free air
time proposals because self-financed candidates or those able to raise large
amounts of money, such as incumbents, could opt out of the system and buy as
many advertisements as they desired. Alternatively, critics may posit that,
under these proposals, well-financed candidates could buy additional
advertisements beyond those bought with their subsidies. Underlying both
criticisms is the concern that, even under a free air time proposal that
guaranteed all federal candidates certain resources, access to money would
continue to determine the extent of a candidate's ability to communicate with
the public.69 However, research demonstrates that in order to be competitive,
challengers need not match their opponents dollar for dollar. Instead, if
candidates meet a certain threshold of spending, even if it is significantly less
than the amounts spent by their opponents, they can be competitive. 7° Thus,
"the most important variable in determining whether a race will be competitive
is not how much money the better financed candidate spends, but how much
money the less well financed candidate spends.",
7 1
Both historical trends and recent campaigns indicate the efficacy of creating
a "floor" of resources for challengers in order to make them competitive. A
study published in the Brookings Review of the 1540 races for the U.S. House
of Representatives from 1976 to 1990 in which an incumbent faced a
69. TAYLOR & ORNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 17.
70. COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 6, at 17-18.
71. TAYLOR & ORNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 17.
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challenger from a major party found that although money is a key factor in
determining competitiveness, challengers need not spend as much as
incumbents to win. In fact, this study indicated that over half of the victorious
challengers spent less than the vanquished incumbent. 72 Recent campaigns also
bear this out: Seven of the nine challengers who defeated House or Senate
incumbents in 1998 spent less than their opponents,73 including both Charles
Schumer 74 and John Edwards. 75 In 2000, multiple challengers defeated
incumbents who spent more than they did, including Debbie Stabenow 76 and
Thomas Carper.77 In 2002, numerous challengers also defeated better funded
incumbents, including Mark Pryor 78 and Jim Talent.
79
Although challengers clearly can be competitive without matching
incumbents' spending dollar for dollar, recent trends, particularly in House
elections, indicate that most challengers are unable to raise the necessary
money-approximately $300,000 in House races-to reach the competitiveness
threshold. 80 In 1998, almost one-half of challengers in House races raised under
$100,000, and only approximately one-third raised $200,000. 81 In 2000, the
median amount raised by Democratic House challengers was $70,079, and the
median amount raised by Republican House challengers was $36,085.82
Consequently, despite the relatively small amount of resources necessary for a
challenger to make a race competitive, the vast majority of House races
72. Jonathan S. Krasno & Donald Philip Green, Stopping the Buck Here: The Case for Campaign
Spending Limits, 11 BROOKINGS REV. 16, 18 (1993).
73. COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 6, at 17.
74. Alfonse D'Amato spent $27.2 million and Schumer spent $16.7 million. Fed. Election
Comm'n, Financial Activity of 1997-98 Senate Campaigns, New York, at
http://www.fec.gov/1996/states/nysen6.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2004).
75. Lauch Faircloth spent $11.7 million and Edwards spent $8.3 million. Fed. 'Election Comm'n,
Financial Activity of 1997-98 Senate Campaigns, North Carolina, at
http://www.fec.gov/1996/states/ncsen6.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2004).
76. SpencerAbraham spent $14.4 million and Stabenow spent $8.1 million. Fed. Election Comm'n,
Financial Activity of 1999-2000 Senate Campaigns, Michigan, at http://www.fec.gov/2000/misen6.htm
(last visited Mar. 22, 2004).
77. William Roth spent $4.4 million and Carper spent $2.5 million. Fed. Election Comm'n,
Financial Activity of 1999-2000 Senate Campaigns, Delaware, at http://www.fec.gov/2000/desen6.htm
(last visited Mar. 22, 2004).
78. Tim Hutchinson spent $2.1 million and Pryor spent $1.5 million. Fed. Election Comm'n, 2001-
2002 Top 50 Senate Campaigns by Disbursements, at
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2002/20020909canstats/t50_18m-s-disb.html (last visited Mar. 22,
2004).
79. Jean Carnahan spent $2.97 million and Jim Talent spent $1.7 million. Id.
80. COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 6, at 18 ("To move well into the competitive range ...
challengers typically need roughly $300,000 or more in resources.") The Committee for Economic
Development determined this figure by calculating the relationship between the campaign spending of
challengers and their percentage of the two-party vote in the 1998 congressional elections. Id.
81. Id. at 117.
82. Fed. Election Comm'n, Median Activity of House General Election Candidates, at




Thus, a free air time proposal that provides all qualifying challengers with a
"floor" of resources would increase the competitiveness of federal elections.
84
If such a plan existed, neither incumbents' inherent fundraising advantages nor
the possibility of facing "millionaire" candidates would serve as strong
deterrents to non-wealthy challengers entering a race; rather, such challengers
would be confident that they will have enough money to make voters aware of
their candidacy, their positions, and their ideas. 85 In addition, by providing all
qualifying candidates with a minimum amount of resources, a free air time
proposal also hopefully would decrease the amount of fundraising engaged in
by candidates, enabling them to spend more time directly serving the public.
8 6
83. COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 6, at 18. While redistricting played a role in the lack of
competitiveness in the 2002 House elections, this factor does not account for the results of pre-2002
elections, which occurred before the institution of the new congressional district maps. As compared to
past years, the 2002 redistricting process was particularly notable for its incumbent-protectionist nature.
See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, House Democrats' Climb Gets Steeper: Party Lacks Rallying Cry as
Redistricting, Incumbency Cut Competitive Races, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2002, at Al ("A decade ago,
there were roughly 100 competitive races following redistricting; this year there will be 30 to 40,
perhaps even fewer .. "); Alison Mitchell, Redistricting 2002 Produces No Great Shake-Ups, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2002, at A20 ("With Congressional redistricting almost complete, the once-a-decade
redrawing of the nation's political map is turning out to favor incumbents to an unusual degree, making
many of the House's swing seats into safer territory for one party or the other."). This development can
be attributed to many factors, including the political parties' more "brazen" pursuit of incumbent
entrenchment and the use of new technology that has significantly facilitated their ability to reduce
competition through gerrymandering. See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels,
116 HARV. L. REv. 593, 624 (2002). The post-2002 increase in the number of seats that are "safe" for a
particular party makes it even more critical to increase the competitiveness of races in those remaining
"swing" districts that are not dominated by one party or the other, which (like the pre-2002 races) will
otherwise remain largely uncompetitive due to the resource-access disparities discussed in this Note.
84. Some may suggest that even with a "floor" of resources, a candidate who relies exclusively on
that floor might still be prevented from mounting a viable campaign if she faces an opponent willing to
spend tremendous amounts of money on the race. While a House candidate with a resource floor of
$375,000 running against an opponent spending $1 million is probably better off then a similarly
situated candidate running against an opponent spending $20 million, even a large resource disparity is
not determinative in campaigns. If candidates are provided with a floor of resources, then they will be
ensured that, no matter how much their opponents spend, they will have sufficient resources to make
voters aware of their campaigns and the ideas they represent. Moreover, as discussed in infra Part V,
nontraditional media can empower even candidates facing opponents with significantly more resources
to run winning campaigns.
85. An educational campaign, possibility instituted by the Federal Election Commission (FEC), that
teaches candidates about only needing a "floor"-and not a dollar-for-dollar match-to be competitive
would also be a key element in the initial implementation stages of the Proposal. The FEC already offers
numerous services-including an anonymous toll-free hotline and multiple annual conferences and
roundtable discussions-to educate candidates, congressional staffers, lawyers, accountants, consultants,
and political committee staff about campaign finance laws. See Fed. Election Comm'n, FEC Services:
Help with the Campaign Finance Law, at http://www.fec.gov/pages/infosvc.htm (last visited Mar. 22,
2004). Education about the utility of a "floor" of resources, as part of a campaign to teach people about a
new campaign subsidization measure such as the one proposed by this Note, could be incorporated into
these existing FEC efforts. Furthermore, the agency could hold special sessions focused specifically
upon the new measure immediately after it is first enacted, as has been suggest the FEC do with the
recently enacted Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. See Jennifer Yachnin, House Admin Requests BCRA
Symposium, ROLL CALL, Oct. 20, 2003.
86. See Hundt, supra note 37, at 1105 ("Of course, even if access to electronic media were cheaper
and easier, many candidates would still raise money for other legitimate campaign purposes. But if
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In sum, providing a minimum floor of resources constitutes a necessary part of
any good free air time proposal.
2. Maximizing the Value of Candidates' Resources Through Reform of
the Lowest Unit Charge Rule
Some of the earlier free air time proposals recognize that an effective free
air time proposal cannot only provide candidates resources; it must also
maximize the value of those resources by addressing the primary flaws in the
existing lowest unit charge framework. Under the current system, stations can
set the lowest rate based on the demand for time on a particular day. Thus, as
the demand for time increases in the last months of a campaign, the rate upon
which the discount is based continues to get higher and higher.87 Because
political advertisers often must buy time close to the date when they want a
commercial to air, as opposed to commercial advertisers who can often buy
their advertising time further in advance, this dynamic particularly impacts
candidates. 88 Furthermore, as discussed above, many commercial advertisers
buy preemptible time, but the unique needs of candidates often requires them to
buy non-preemptible time, for which stations charge a further premium. 89 This
need for non-preemptible time, and uncertainty about how high the price of
such time could reach, drives a candidate to engage in preemptive fundraising
to ensure that she will have enough resources to afford advertising time
throughout her entire campaign.
By requiring stations to base the lowest unit charge on the price that the
station has given to any advertiser for the same class and amount of time during
an extended period before the candidate's own use-such as the 120 days
proposed by the Political Broadcast Campaign Activity Improvement Act 
9
-
candidates could" be guaranteed access to a reasonable amount of air time, they could certainly cut back
on their fundraising efforts and devote more time to the work for which the public hired them. I doubt
there is an elected official who would not prefer such an outcome.").
87. See supra Section lI.B. As an advertising salesman for NBC's New York affiliate stated, "Yes,
we do raise the [lowest unit charge] for candidates from week to week if everyone else's rates are going
up .... We're not supposed to lose money on campaigns, so if the demand is there, we raise the cost of
doing business for everyone." ALLIANCE FOR BETTER CAMPAIGNS, supra note 19, at
http://www.bettercampaigns.org/reports/display.php?PagelD=40.
88. This distinctive need of candidates can be attributed to a variety of factors. Often candidates use
advertisements to respond quickly to breaking news stories or advertisements run by opponents, and
thus do not know whether they will want to run an advertisements until very soon before they need it to
air. In addition, the dynamics of a race can change quickly-with some candidates dropping out and new
candidates joining the race-which also makes it difficult for candidates to engage in much advance
planning. Finally, the extent of candidates' advertisements purchases depends on how much money they
possess. Because fundraising efforts are often contingent on performance (or poll numbers), candidates
frequently do not know far ahead of time whether they will have the resources to run advertisements.
89, See supra Section II.B.
90. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. It is important to note that this 120-day period is
only used to set the rate for the time; candidates will only be entitled to buy time at this rate for the sixty
days before a general election and the forty-five days before a primary election, as provided in current
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and by compelling them to treat as non-preemptible those candidate
advertisements bought at the preemptible rate, a free air time proposal makes
the lowest aspect of the lowest unit charge meaningful and thus maximizes the
value of the resources granted to candidates through a free air time plan.
91
Consequently, these proposed reforms of existing law should be included in
any free air time plan.
C. Weaknesses of Past Proposals
While many of the previously suggested free air time proposals include
desirable aspects, they each also contain design defects that undermine their
effectiveness. The primary weakness of these past proposals is their almost
exclusive focus on providing candidates with free or reduced-price broadcast
television time and thus their failure to give candidates the flexibility to use
advertising subsidies in the matter they believe to be most efficacious. Many of
the past proposals contain additional drawbacks, such as imposing content
restrictions on candidates as a condition of their receiving free air time,
requiring television stations to air specific types of campaign-related
programming in addition to giving candidates free air time, and relying on
voluntary commitments by broadcasters. The inclusion of such provisions in a
free air time plan would be a mistake and should therefore be avoided.
1. Lack of Flexibility
All of the previously advanced proposals share a common fundamental
flaw: They focus their attention almost exclusively on providing or subsidizing
broadcast television air time. However, many federal candidates have different
requirements because of the specific office for which they are running, the
media market or markets in which their constituents reside, or other reasons.
For these candidates, it may not make sense to run advertisements on broadcast
television.92 While broadcast television historically has played a predominant
role in campaigns, other media-particularly the Internet and cable television-
perform increasingly important functions. By limiting subsidies to broadcast
television advertising, a free air time proposal may skew candidates' spending
law.
91. Although these requirements will likely result in some financial losses to broadcasters, the
losses are likely to be less drastic than some members of the broadcasting industry claim. According to
an industry source, the losses "are likely to be limited to less than 10 percent, because increased demand
is expected to result in higher prices for the limited commercial inventory remaining." Doug Halonen,
Cry Raised Against Cheap Political Spots, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Apr. 9, 2001, at 3.
92. As Taylor and Ornstein point out, this approach also does not make sense for television
stations. In their discussion of a hypothetical system that gave all candidates a fixed number of ads, they
note that television stations in large media markets, such as New York or Philadelphia, would face
severe difficulties due to the fact that such broadcasters' coverage areas encompass many congressional
districts. TAYLOR & ORNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 26 n.33.
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decisions. Consequently, an effective free air time proposal must give
candidates the flexibility to use the resources provided by the government on
media other than broadcast stations.
2. Content Restrictions on How Candidates Can Use Their Free Air Time
Beyond restrictions on which media candidates can use their subsidies,
some of the proposed plans would impose content restrictions on
advertisements that are aired using the free air time, for example, requiring
candidates to refrain from airing "attack ads." 93 Others would only offer free air
time in certain forms, such as five-minute blocks, in order to promote a certain
type of campaign discourse. 94 These measures fail to account for the reality that
candidates compete not just against other candidates, but also against
commercial advertisers and traditional entertainment to gain the attention of
voters. As a result, it is essential that a free air time plan avoids placing undue
burdens on candidates' ability to vie for attention in the marketplace of ideas.
95
Such restrictions impede candidates' capabilities to explore the limits of their
imagination-an important feature as candidates increasingly take advantage of
non-traditional media. While some might think that certain attack messages or
other advertisements are undesirable, 96 it is best for the government to refrain
from making content-based distinctions among different kinds of campaign
93. The primary reason for the government to avoid making such distinctions is that differentiating
helpful from harmful campaign discourse is not always straightforward, creating the risk that
government intrusion will do more harm than good. Widespread beliefs about what types of
advertisements facilitate voters' ability to make informed decisions about candidates, held by
officeholders, agency officials, candidates, commentators, and others, are largely false. Kathleen Hall
Jamieson, one of the foremost scholars on political communication, explains that, despite popular
assumptions, so-called "negative advertising" is frequently more useful than "positive advertising" in
helping voters make informed decisions about how to vote. She explains that what many call "attack
ads" (i.e., advertisements that focus on candidates' failings) often help voters to distinguish between
candidates and make informed decisions about elections. KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, EVERYTHING
You THINK YOU KNOW ABOUT POLITICS... AND WHY YOU'RE WRONG 103-106 (2000). In a study
conducted of presidential advertisements from 1952-1996, Jamieson found that "attack ads" are more
likely to contain relevant, substantive information about candidates' policy positions than
advertisements that people typically regard as "positive" (i.e., "advocacy ads" or "issue ads"). Id. Thus,
Jamieson's work indicates the danger in allowing the government to regulate the use of "attack ads" or
other types of messages that are widely (but potentially falsely) thought to be harmful to campaign
discourse-such efforts would actually inhibit the amount of useful information that voters receive.
94. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Levinson, Note, An Informed Electorate: Requiring Broadcasters To
Provide Free Airtime to Candidates for Public Office, 72 B.U. L. REV. 143, 159-62 (1992).
95. See Hundt, supra note 37, at 1107-08 ("Candidates, like it or not, compete for attention against
the most creative people in the world: those who invent broadcast television shows and ads. We must
give candidates and their advisers the room to use their own ingenuity to attract an audience and to get
their message across.").
96. This approach has been embraced by officeholders and commentators. For instance, Senator
Dorgan-cosponsor of the Political Campaign Broadcasting Activity Improvements Act-stated,
"Certainly the 30-second political attack ad does little, if anything, to inform the public about the issues
and advance the debate." 144 CONG. REC. S 1076 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1998) (statement of Sen. Dorgan).
Observers of elections have offered a similarly negative view of "attack ads." See, e.g., Editorial, Those
Infernal Attack Ads, BALT. SUN, Nov. 2, 1994, at 18A.
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messages.
3. Requiring Broadcast Stations To Air Certain Content in Addition to
Free Air Time
Another undesirable restriction included in some of the previously proposed
plans is a requirement that broadcast stations air a certain amount of election-
or candidate-centered programming for a designated period before an election
in addition to giving candidates free air time.97 Although these further
restrictions on broadcast licensees could offer some value, their benefits do not
outweigh their drawbacks. First, and most importantly, a successful solution to
the information deficit and lack of competition in campaigns requires more
candidate-controlled speech. However, broadcast stations' coverage of
campaigns often provides little substantive information to voters, focusing
instead on the "horserace" or strategic aspects of the campaign, giving short
shrift to challengers, and favoring analysis from reporters and pundits over
unfiltered communication from candidates. 98 It may be possible to formulate
programming requirements that address concerns about the content of
coverage; however, creating, implementing, and enforcing compliance with
such rules would place a large administrative burden on the FCC, which would
already be forced to increase its monitoring efforts of these stations if a free air
time plan contained revised lowest unit charge rules. Moreover, any effective
programming rules would involve excessive government entanglement in
broadcast stations' programming decisions, which is potentially more
constitutionally suspect than increased governmental involvement in reviewing
advertising rates. As a result, because of concerns with their efficacy and the
administrative difficulties they would entail, programming requirements should
be avoided.
4. Voluntary Measures
In deciding what public interest obligations should be imposed on
broadcasters in return for the federal government's giving them the valuable
digital spectrum space at no charge, the Gore Commission ultimately
recommended voluntary commitments by broadcasters to air five minutes of
candidate-centered discourse per night for the thirty days before an election
(the 5/30 standard). Broadcasters initially suggested they were amenable to
these voluntary standards, but the low level of compliance with them indicates
the problem with this approach. In the thirty nights before the 2000 general
election, for example, none of the networks offered the recommended five
97. See, e.g., Political Campaign Broadcasting Activity Improvement Act, S. 3124, 107th Cong. § 3
(2002); TAYLOR & ORNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 17.
98. See supra Section II.C.
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minutes of candidate-centered discourse. 99 In fact, the average amount of time
offered reached a mere 1.23 minutes. 100 Even when given $70 billion worth of
spectrum space, local stations and networks still failed to meet a minimal
voluntary standard. Thus, a free air time plan which relies on voluntary
measures is destined to fail.
IV. THE PROPOSAL: A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL MEDIA SUBSIDIZATION AND
REFORM PROPOSAL
A. The Elements of the Proposal
The Note's Proposal draws upon the best features of past plans-and avoids
their pitfalls-while also taking into account the evolving media dynamics that
shape modem campaigns. Although some of the past plans properly reflected
an understanding that increased competitiveness can be achieved by providing
all candidates with a certain minimum level of resources, most incorporated an
outdated conception of the current media environment and thus severely limited
their own potential effectiveness. As a result, one key element of the Proposal
is the provision of a minimum floor of resources to all qualifying candidates
that can be utilized on any type of advertising or promotional activity that they
desire, whether on broadcast, cable, or satellite television, radio, the Internet,
newspapers, magazines, direct mail, billboards, flyers, posters, or any other
type of similar general communication media. By providing candidates the
critical floor of resources found in previous proposals but allowing them to
spend those resources on any form of advertising or promotional activity, the
Proposal should maximize its usefulness to all federal candidates. It should
function well whether applied to a House candidate in New York, who may
believe that her resources are best spent on direct mail, a Senate candidate in
New Jersey, who may want to rely primarily on radio and cable advertisements,
or the Republican nominee for President, who may desire to focus her
resources on broadcast television advertisements.
The Proposal includes another innovative element that differentiates it from
previous plans: It provides candidates with resources specifically earmarked for
Internet-based campaigning. The Internet's unique attributes are particularly
conducive to increasing competitiveness and the quality and quantity of
information exchanged in campaigns. 1° 1 Because candidates have thus far
failed to make widespread use of these nontraditional media, the provision of
99. FALK & ADAY, supra note 31 (describing the results of a study conducted by the Annenberg
Public Policy Center).
100. KAPLAN & HALE, supra note 32, at 1 (describing the results of a study conducted by the
Norman Lear Center).
101. See infra Part V.
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the Internet-specific resources will encourage and shape candidates' uses of this
important medium.'°2
In order to fund these subsidies, the Note's Proposal utilizes a modified
version of the funding, qualification, and distribution systems found in previous
proposals. To pay for its cost, a spectrum fee will be assessed on the gross
annual revenues of all spectrum license holders. This fee will fund a
"Campaign Media Trust Fund" from which the subsidies-the value of which
will be set at $850 million for the 2004 election cycle-will be distributed.,0 3
102. Although the designation of funds for Internet-based activities represents a departure from the
Proposal's animating principle of flexibility in subsidy use, the unique qualities of the Internet for
campaign purposes, the fact that it remains vastly underutilized, and the potential for campaign subsidies
to stimulate its utilization, as well as the fact that the Internet-specific funds are a supplement to the
much larger provision of general-use resources, justify this departure. These funds will spur candidates
who otherwise would not think to use the Internet to consider how they can leverage it in their
campaigns. The Internet can be useful even for candidates seeking to represent constituencies which are
largely unfamiliar with it. For instance, such a candidate can use the Internet to reach donors residing
outside her district who would be interested in providing support but who would otherwise not have
learned about the candidate or have been able to easily communicate with her. See infra Section V.A. In
addition, the Internet can be used to connect with and motivate those few people within a district who do
have access to the Internet to reach out to and mobilize, in the old-fashioned way, those who do not use
the Intemet. See id. Therefore, although earmarking certain supplemental resources for Internet-specific
uses reduces campaigns' flexibility, the extent of this diminution is negligible. Under the Proposal,
campaigns receive the bulk of the subsidies without any rules about the type of advertising or
promotional activity for which the funds can be used. Furthermore, these restrictions are less onerous
than they may at first appear, for the Internet can be useful even to those candidates campaigning in
areas with low levels of Internet penetration.
103. This amount is $100 million more than that called for in the Political Broadcast Campaign
Activity Improvements Act. This increase reflects the additional funds that the Proposal provides for
Interet-specific subsidies and the desire to ensure that there are adequate funds for qualifying third-
party candidates. The $850 million figure covers the cost of the Proposal based on the following
calculations:
Each election year, elections are held for the 435 seats in the House of Representatives. I estimate
that in each of those elections, there will be an average of two and a half candidates who would qualify
for funds under the Proposal. In many races, only the general election candidates from the two major
parties would qualify; in others, a third-party candidate or a major party candidate in a primary would
qualify; in yet other races, some of those candidates or other candidates would qualify for only a
percentage of the maximum funds. Under the Proposal, each qualifying House candidate could receive a
maximum of $375,000, plus $75,000 in Internet-designated funds. Based upon these figures, the cost per
House race amounts to $1.125 million, so that the total cost of funding all 435 House races amounts to
$489,375,000.
The funding that Senate candidates receive under the Proposal is based on the number of
congressional districts that exist in their states. For instance, a Serfate candidate with ten congressional
districts in her state would be eligible to receive a maximum of $3.75 million, plus $750,000 in Internet-
designated funds. In each election cycle, elections are held for a third of the 100 Senate seats. To
determine the average number of congressional districts that the states with Senate races in any given
election cycle will encompass, one can divided the total number of districts (435) by three, for a total of
145 districts. That figure can be multiplied by the cost per House race ($1.125 million) to determine the
total maximum cost for funding the Senate races-$ 163,125,000.
The Proposal would allow presidential candidates to receive $1 for every $1 they raise in matching
funds in the primary and $0.50 for every dollar they raise in matching funds in the general election, plus
an additional $0.20 for every dollar they raise in primary or general election matching funds for Internet-
specific expenditures. In the 2004 election, the estimated maximum of matching funds that primary
candidates can receive is $18,600,000, and the estimated maximum for general election candidates is
$74,400,000. See Fed. Election Comm'n, Presidential Election Campaign Fund, at
http://www.fec.gov/press/bkgnd/fund.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2004). If one estimates that four
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This cost will be indexed to increase at the pace of inflation in subsequent
election years. For candidates to qualify to receive resources from the Trust
Fund, they would be required to raise a certain limited amount of money in
small donations. This provision compels a candidate to show her viability
before she receive funds. In this way, the Proposal does not discriminate
against candidates from minor political parties-a candidate from any political
party, whether major or minor, can receive money if she demonstrates her
viability-but it also ensures that funds will not be wasted through
indiscriminate distribution to candidates who clearly lack sufficient support to
be competitive. In addition, the amount of money candidates receive-both in
unrestricted and Internet-specific funds-will be based on the small donation
fundraising. 10 4 The emphasis that these qualification and funding mechanisms
place on small donors should have a positive effect on fundraising practices.
0 5
Although a primary goal of this Proposal is to encourage and incentivize
candidates' use of nontraditional media, broadcast television will likely remain
a key element of many candidates' advertising strategies, at least for the short
candidates will participate in the matching funding system and receive the maximum in the primary, the
cost under the Proposal would be $89,280,000, while the cost for the general election would be
$104,160,000. These estimates are particularly generous, however, because in the 2004 election cycle,
both of the likely major party nominees, as well as an additional contestant in the Democratic primary,
completely opted out of the matching-funds system in the primary election.
Based on these calculations, the total cost of the Proposal for an election cycle in which a
presidential campaign occurred would be $845,940,000 ($489,375,000 plus $163,125,000 plus
$89,280,000 plus $104,160,000).
104. See supra note 66 for an explanation of the funding mechanism, which draws upon the
PCBAIA model. In addition to the funds that would be provided under a PCBAIA-type system, all
candidates would receive twenty cents for every $1 they receive either through fundraising (if a
congressional candidate, not including donated amounts beyond $250 from any individual) or through
public financing (if they are a presidential candidate) to be spent only on Internet-based campaign
activities. These funds would not count against the cap on money that congressional candidates can
receive from the general-use portion of the Trust Fund. For instance, a candidate for the U.S House of
Representatives could receive the maximum $375,000 from the general-use portion of the Trust Fund
plus money from the Intemet-specific portion of the Trust Fund. Similarly, for presidential candidates,
the use of either the general or the Internet-specific Trust Fund money would not count against the
expenditure limits imposed by the publicly financed matching-funds system.
105. By setting the qualifying donation limit ($250) at a level well below the maximum permitted
by campaign-finance laws for indivilual donations (currently $2,000), the Proposal should increase the
importance of small donors. Under the current system, the transaction costs involved in raising money
often make it economically inefficient for candidates to spend their time raising small donations.
However, because small donations are the means through which candidates would qualify to receive
Trust Fund resources, the Proposal should make it more worthwhile for candidates to solicit small
donors. This emphasis on small donors should neutralize some of the traditional fundraising advantages
of wealthy challengers, who can self-finance their campaigns, as well as incumbents. See, e.g., Jonathan
S. Cohn, Money Talks, Reform Walks, AM. PROSPECT, Fall 1993, at 66 (discussing how campaign
finance rules that permit large donations favor incumbents, noting that "[i]ncumbents are the ones with
the ties to fundraising masterminds, and incumbents are the ones who receive the vast majority of
money from special interests"). Howard Dean's campaign demonstrated that a reliance primarily on
small donors can make a non-wealthy, non-incumbent candidate financially competitive with wealthy or
established candidates. See, e.g., Susan Page, While Losing, Dean Has Transformed Race, Politics, USA
TODAY, Feb. 9,2004, at IA.
Free Air Time
term.1°6 As a result, it is essential that a free air time plan address the failure of
current campaign laws designed to guarantee candidates low-cost access to the
airwaves. In order to address these deficiencies, the Proposal retains the lowest
unit charge but sets it by a new standard, extending the period on which it is
based from the forty-five or sixty days immediately preceding a primary or
general election to the 365 days before the use by a candidate or party.
Furthermore, the Proposal prohibits stations from preempting the
advertisements purchased by candidates, even if they buy "preemptible" air
time, except in circumstances beyond a station's control. 10 7 By implementing
these two changes, the Proposal eliminates two loopholes that have eviscerated
the protection that the lowest unit charge rules are intended to provide.
Moreover, in order to encourage candidates to use other forms of television,
such as cable, which can be more cost-effective means of communicating with
voters, the Proposal also amends existing campaign laws that currently apply
only to broadcast stations to include cable stations as well. First, it extends the
lowest unit charge requirement, based on the revised standard, to cable
systems. 10 8 Second, it applies the reasonable access rules for broadcast stations
to cable television providers,10 9 requiring them to offer air time to federal
candidates who can afford it and thereby providing a meaningful guarantee of
the lowest unit charge requirement.
While previously proposed reforms had merit and advanced the thinking on
this subject, the Proposal outlined in this Note best addresses the problems
endemic in modem campaigns by providing all qualifying candidates with a
floor of resources, granting candidates additional funds to be used on Internet-
based campaigning, and reforming existing campaign laws to maximize the
value of the resources provided. In doing so, the Proposal will reintroduce
competitiveness into elections, facilitate the flow of information needed by
voters to make decisions within the democratic process, and advance the use of
new media that are particularly well suited to achieve the first two goals. While
any measure to reform campaign practices faces an uphill battle-after all,
incumbents in Congress typically are reluctant to change policies that run to
106. As Ron Brownstein, a prominent political columnist, wrote, "The Internet probably won't
replace television anytime soon as the dominant way campaigns communicate with voters. But its use is
steadily growing." Ron Brownstein, Liberal Group Flexes Online Muscle in Its Very Own Primary, L.A.
TIMES, June 23, 2003, at 9.
107. The changes to the lowest unit charge rules resemble the changes found in the Political
Campaign Broadcast Activity Improvement Act, S. 3124, 107th Cong. (2002), except it extends the
period on which stations must base the lowest unit charge rate from 120 to 365 days. In this respect, the
Proposal draws on the Torricelli Amendment to the McCain-Feingold campaign finance bill, S. Amend.
122 to S. 27, 107th Cong. (2001). As campaigns become longer, it is critical that the period on which the
lowest unit charge is set also expands.
108. Currently cable systems are only required to offer candidates the lowest unit charge once they
allow any candidate for a particular office to advertise. Cablecasting, 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.205-.206 (2003).
However, they are under no obligation to provide reasonable access to political candidates. Id. § 76.205.
109. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (2000).
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their advantage-the successful enactment of the McCain-Feingold campaign
finance reform measure demonstrates that such change is possible; it may just
require many years of discussion and struggle. This ambitious Proposal is
intended to highlight not only the best features of earlier proposals, but also
some crucial areas that these proposals have overlooked, in the hopes of
spurring this necessary future debate and informing future policy initiatives.
B. Broadcasters'Arguments Against Such a Proposal Are Unpersuasive
Because the Proposal will be funded through a spectrum fee and many of its
provisions will impact broadcasters, it is important to consider broadcasters'
arguments-all of which are entirely unpersuasive-against free air time
proposals.
First, broadcasters assert that the financial burdens imposed by free air time
proposals are too great.' 10 However, as a result of government policies,
broadcasters have reaped significant financial gains. In 2001, one Wall Street
analyst estimated, based on recent auctions of other parts of the spectrum, that
the value of the free spectrum licenses granted to broadcasters is as high as
$367 billion, a figure that exceeds the stock market value of all U.S. broadcast
stations combined."' Although the broadcasters ostensibly must return their
analog spectrum licenses to the government in exchange for this digital
spectrum space on December 31, 2006,112 the law contains a loophole that
makes such a return exceedingly unlikely. 1 3 The broadcasters also receive
other government-created economic benefits at no charge, including the "must
carry" rules for cable operators and additional spectrum space for digital
television. 114 Therefore, government policies essentially create billions of
110. See, e.g., Campaign Finance Reform: Proposals Impacting Broadcasters, Cable Operators,
and Satellite Providers: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Telecomm. and the Internet, 107th
Cong. 18 (2001) (statement of Jack Sander, Executive Vice President Media Operations, Belo Corp.)
(claiming that one aspect of some free air time proposals-revising the lowest unit charge rules-would
"severely injur[e] a television station's ability to raise revenue"); Amy Keller, More Reform Battles
Ahead, ROLL CALL, Mar. 25, 2002 (describing how the National Association of Broadcasters argued to
Congress that revisions of the lowest unit charge rules "pose substantial financial burdens to the
industry, and could even result in lay-offs of employees").
111. MICHAEL CALABRESE, BATTLE OVER THE AIRWAVES: PRINCIPLES FOR SPECTRUM POLICY
REFORM 3 (New America Foundation, Spectrum Series Issue Brief No. 1, 2001) (citing Tom Wolzien,
Speech Before the National Association of Broadcasters Future Summit (Apr. 2001)), available at
http://www.newamerica.net/Download Docs/pdfs/Pub File647_ 1 .pdf.
112. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(14)(A) (2000).
113. An individual broadcast station (e.g., an NBC affiliate in Mississippi) does not have to return
its analog licenses if one of the following conditions occurs: (1) one or more of the local stations
affiliated with one of the four largest broadcast networks is not broadcasting a digital television signal,
id. § 309(j)(14)(B)(i); (2) digital-to-analog converter technology is not generally available in that
market, id. § 3090)(14)(B)(ii); or (3) digital television is not available to eighty-five percent or more of
the viewers in that market, id. § 309(j)(14)(B)(iii), something that is unlikely to happen in most
television markets for many years (if at all). See Walter S. Ciciora, James Madison Would Be
Disappointed, COMM. ENGINEERING & DESIGN, Feb. 1, 2003, at 52.
114. TAYLOR & ORNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 7-8.
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dollars of value for broadcasters, yet the Proposal only requires them to pay
between 0.5% and 1% of their gross annual revenue in order to raise $850
million dollars. This amount cannot be characterized as a major financial
burden.
Second, broadcasters claim that they already offer concessions to
candidates at their own expense and thus that demanding any more of them
would be unfair. They cite the discounted air time and "free air time" that they
provide candidates as examples of their existing efforts. 115 However, as
previously discussed, broadcasters' manipulation of current law has essentially
eviscerated the existing lowest unit charge rules,116 while at the same time
broadcasters have continually reduced their news coverage and debate time. 117
Furthermore, the type of exposure that candidates gain through news coverage
or through the airing of debates differs significantly from that gained through
advertisements. As the Congressional Research Service notes, "only in
[advertisements] does the candidate have full control over how his or her
message is presented, and for that reason the spot ads have come to play the
major role they do in our elections."" 8 Moreover, broadcasters have
demonstrated unwillingness to comply even with voluntary measures, such as
the 5/30 standard, for improving their coverage of candidates and campaigns.
119
As Norman Omstein, one of the co-chairs of the Gore Commission, recently
stated, "If the [broadcast stations owners] are not going to do something that
minimal, then it becomes clear that the voluntary aspect of this is just a
joke."' 20
115. This view is reflected in the recent comments of the general manager of the ABC affiliate in
Manchester, New Hampshire . He stated, "In the last election, we had 14 free half-hours (of features on
candidates), two live debates, and we asked all the candidates about the 10 biggest questions facing the
state and edited their answers together for broadcast so people could see their opinions on the issues, not
to mention their normal appearances on the newscasts.... We think we offer plenty of free air time."
Dan Atkinson, Sununu: Free Ads in Elections Wrong, UNION LEADER (Manchester, N.H.), Mar. 3, 2004,
at C7 (quoting Jeff Bartlett, general manager of New Hampshire's WMUR-TV.).
116. See supra Section II.B.
117. See supra Section II.C. Some broadcasters have attributed these reductions to the increased
coverage of politics on cable. However, although candidates should be encouraged to make better use of
cable television, which would enable them to develop targeted political advertisements, see supra
Section V.B, the size of the audiences on the cable news networks does not begin to approach that of the
nightly network newscasts. Even after years of ratings attrition, the nightly newscasts on ABC, CBS,
and NBC have continued to average a combined audience of thirty million, while CNN and the Fox
News Channel each average only about one million viewers during prime time, with these dropping
significantly during other time periods. TAYLOR & ORNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 13. Furthermore, even if
the total number of people relying on cable and the Internet for news information one day equals that of
broadcast, the issue of cost remains-broadcast television is free while cable and Internet connection
fees cost $40 or more per month. If broadcasters are allowed to justify their lack of political coverage by
relying on the coverage provided by other media, then the United States will be left with "a 'subscription
democracy' in which the only citizens who had a front row seat to their presidential campaign would be
those who could pay a monthly fee for the privilege." Id. at 14.
118. CANTOR ET AL., supra note 2, at 24.
119. See supra Subsection III.C.4.
120. Telephone Interview with Norman Ornstein, Co-Chair, Gore Commission, and Resident
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In sum, broadcasters' arguments about why they should not have to pay a
spectrum fee to finance candidates' speech across media carry little weight. The
burden of such a fee is small, their current efforts are minimal, and their refusal
to comply with even trivial voluntary standard indicates the necessity of a
government-mandated measure.
V. THE POLICY: THE UTILITY OF INCENTIVIZING THE USE OF NONTRADITIONAL
MEDIA IN CAMPAIGNS
The key innovation of the Proposal is its dual focus on giving candidates
the utmost flexibility to use government-granted resources on different types of
media during political campaigns while also stimulating the use of
underutilized media through various statutory and regulatory changes. In
addition, the Proposal provides targeted subsidies to foster campaign activities
specifically on the Internet, hence serving as a potential catalyst for the growth
of the Internet as a key campaign tool. Voters are increasing turning to the
Internet to gain information about campaigns, 21 yet most campaigns have
remained skeptical about its value122 or have failed to fully exploit its
advantages. While some candidates-notably Jesse Ventura, John McCain, and
Howard Dean-have used the Internet in innovative ways to exploit its power
as a campaign tool, 123 too many others have only used the Internet to post
policy papers or speeches on relatively static websites, vastly overlooking the
sophisticated possibilities offered by current Internet technology.124 In giving
candidates resources specifically earmarked for Internet-based campaigning,
the Proposal provides them-even those whose disinterest, distrust, or
discomfort with new technology would otherwise lead them to shy away from
spending money on this campaign medium-a strong financial incentive to
Scholar, American Enterprise Institute (Apr. 7, 2003).
121. According to a study conducted by the Pew Internet & American Life Project, more American
voters utilized the Internet to acquire campaign information during the 2002 midterm elections than
during the previous midterm elections in 1998. This reflected not only growth in the size of the online
population, but also an increase in the proportion of those using the Internet to access election-related
news. The latter figure grew from fifteen percent in 1998 to twenty-two percent in 2002. PEW INTERNET
& AM. LIFE PROJECT, MODEST INCREASE IN INTERNET USE FOR CAMPAIGN 2002, at 1 (2003), available
at http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/pdfs/PRC PIP Election_2002.pdf.
122. See, e.g., Ann M. Mack, Politicians Log On, MEDIAWEEK, Jan. 26, 2004 (suggesting the
reason more campaigns have not utilized the Internet is that most of the people running campaigns are
wedded to the old orthodoxy that television should be the primary campaign tool); Cliff Sloan, Coming
Soon to a Computer Near You: Gigabytes of Politicking, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2003, at B 11 (same);
Mark Glaser, Candidates Slow to Bring Political Advertising Dollars to the Web, ONLINE JOURNALISM
REV., Feb. 2, 2004 (same), available at http://www.ojr.org/ojr/glaser/I075699362.php.
123. See, e.g., Frank Rich, Napster Runs for President in '04, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, § 2, at I
(discussing the Dean campaign's "breakthrough" use of the Internet, which was utilized not only to
inform voters and to raise money, but also to "empower passionate supporters" to engage in grassroots
political organizing).
124. See, e.g., id. ("To say that competing campaigns don't get it is an understatement.... The
other Democratic websites are very 2000, despite all their blogs and other gizmos.").
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develop campaign strategies that incorporate the Internet; after all, by being
offered Internet-specific funds, candidates will effectively lose resources that
they would have received if they fail to do so.
The various mechanisms in the Proposal designed to stimulate the use of
the Internet and other underutilized media, particularly cable television, are
important due to their distinctive advantages over broadcast television and
other types of media typically used in campaigns. These advantages-which
render these underutilized media particularly promising for increasing the
competitiveness and informativeness of campaigns-fall into four general
categories: their relative inexpensiveness, their capacity to communicate more
individualized messages, their potential to enable more interactive political
dialog, and the immediacy with which they allow candidates to reach votes. In
the following Sections, each of these advantages will be explored in turn.
A. Inexpensiveness
The low cost of utilizing the Internet or cable television offers a key
advantage over the use of broadcast television: Because it is significantly
cheaper to advertise, organize, or fundraise over either of these media than over
broadcast television, candidates can engage in significantly more
communication, organizing, and fundraising using less resources.
Cable allows candidates to employ television advertising without incurring
the high costs of broadcast. The price per viewer to advertise on cable remains
forty-five to sixty percent less than the price on broadcast television.125 Despite
this advantage, candidates thus far have largely failed to appreciate the many
benefits offered by cable advertising, 126 with the portion of political advertising
budgets spent on cable remaining below ten percent.1 27 By giving candidates
resources to spend on advertising and guaranteeing them affordable access to
125. Jon Lafayette, All TV Networks Are Not Created Equal, CABLE WORLD, Mar. 3, 2003, at 9.
For the prized viewing demographic between 18 and 49 years old, it currently costs $21.10 to reach
1000 viewers during prime time on broadcast stations; it costs about half of that-$10.60-to
accomplish the same on cable. Id.
126. Candidates do not buy cable advertising in significant amounts even in local races, despite the
seemingly natural fit between such candidates' needs and cable's ability to deliver cheaper, more
targeted messages. For example, the general election candidates in the 2001 New York mayoral race
spent only five percent of their total $43 million in television advertising expenditures on cable. This led
one cable company executive to complain that cable was not receiving its "rightful share" of political
advertising, which he estimates should have amounted to twenty-two percent of television advertising
outlays in that race. Christopher Schultz, Stumping for a Fair Share of Political Advertising, CABLE
WORLD, Nov. 12, 2001, at 46. Part of the problem may be that cable television systems, in comparison
to their broadcast competitors, have not done as good of a job of selling the advantages of their medium
to candidates. As one cable executive stated, "The cable industry doesn't do a good job telling our story
[to the political community]. They don't seem to realize that a percentage of every broadcast TV station
dollar spent, say in New York, went to waste since [the buy] also covered New Jersey and Connecticut."
Jim Forkan, Political Looks Down for the Count, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Dec. 4, 2000, at 56.
127. TAYLOR & ORNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 22.
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cable stations through the revised access and lowest unit charge rules,' 28 the
Proposal should raise the profile of cable television as a campaign medium.
These statutory changes should especially appeal to those federal candidates
running for House seats in major urban areas such as New York and Los
Angeles, who often cannot afford to buy very much, if any, advertising time on
broadcast stations. 129
The Internet similarly offers significant cost-based advantages to
candidates, enabling them to communicate with a much greater number of
voters at far lower costs than could be achieved over other media. 130 In effect,
as some political campaigns are beginning to understand, the Internet allows
candidates to engage in essentially unlimited unfiltered communication with
voters at little expense.131
Beyond advertising, the low cost of communicating via the Internet can
also have a transformative effect on campaigns' ability to organize volunteers
and mobilize supporters, enabling resource-disadvantaged campaigns to engage
in these activities on a scale that would have been impossible otherwise. Jesse
Ventura's campaign for governor of Minnesota constitutes one of those ground-
breaking efforts. His use of the Internet to recruit and coordinate volunteers has
been recognized as essential to his victory in that 1998 election. 32 Similarly,
supporters of Howard Dean's presidential campaign pioneered the use of
Meetup.com, a website that allows people of similar interests to connect with
each other and set up in-person meetings at prearranged locations with little or
no cost to the campaign.' 33 Other campaigns and their supporters, following
128. Cable systems are already required to offer all candidates for a particular office the lowest unit
rate if they allow any candidate for that same office to buy advertising time. However, cable systems are
not required to provide political candidates reasonable access in the first place, and thus, if they choose,
can deny all candidates the ability to purchase available advertising time. See supra note 108.
129. Anthony Corrado, The Public Interest and Digital Broadcasting: Options for Political
Programming, in COMMUNICATIONS & SOC'Y PROGRAM, ASPEN INSTIT., DIGITAL BROADCASTING AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 293, 305 (Charles M. Firestone & Amy Korzick Garmer eds., 1998)
("[T]elevision and radio advertising does not play as great a role in House races, in part because almost
one in six House districts is in a major urban area where television advertising may not be cost
effective .... "), available at http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/asp06/asp0O6o.html.
130. Chris Schroeder, Online Ads, CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS, Feb. 2004, at 38 ("In many
campaigns, a point is reached where television simply can't be bought, because it's not available or it's
too expensive. The Internet offers far greater flexibility and allows limited dollars to be spent more
efficiently. In a recent.., cross-media study, Colgate found that it costs 23 percent more to get the
marketing results the company wanted when they used only television as opposed to television in
combination with online advertising.").
131. See Ben While, Electrons as Electors? Probably Not Yet, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2000, at AI0
("Both [the Bush and Gore] campaigns stress the importance of. .. using the Web as a direct line to
voters, allowing the presentation of 'unfiltered' issue information, schedules and video from TV ads and
events on the campaign trail.").
132. See, e.g., Greg Miller, Web Helped the Decision Go To Jesse 'The Body' Ventura, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 1998, at C3 ("[L]ike most campaigns that used the Net effectively, Ventura depended on it less
to get his message out than to mobilize and organize his backers.").
133. After seeing the success of the website as an organizing tool, the Dean campaign became a
paying client of Meetup.com. The Dean campaign entered into "a bargain-rate contract with Meetup,
Vol. 22:351, 2004
Free Air Time
Dean's example, also began using Meetup.com. 134 The Dean campaign also
utilized other social-network software that helped supporters organize
independent Dean events and build support networks on their own via the
Internet, without the supervision of the central office. 135 By encouraging such
decentralized activity over the Internet and empowering supporters to act on
their own, the campaign ensured that substantially more Dean events would
occur than if the central office had relied exclusively on its own resources to
organize supporters. Thus, the Ventura and Dean campaigns' use of the Internet
demonstrate how its unique qualities can be exploited for political gain,
empowering initially resource-poor candidates to build grassroots support
networks and thus compete against initially better-funded, higher profile
opponents. 136 By thus facilitating traditional campaigning and get-out-the-vote
activities, the Internet served as a vital means for increasing the
competitiveness of both races.
The inexpensiveness of the Internet also can dramatically improve a
campaign's fundraising abilities. Direct mail operators typically charge
between forty and fifty cents for every dollar that they raise and rarely manage
to achieve a return rate above one percent (i.e., one donation for every one
hundred letters mailed); telemarketers charge even more, up to seventy cents
for every dollar raised, and have an equally dismal return rate.' 37 Internet-based
fundraising costs significantly less.138 Moreover, unlike traditional, in-person
fundraising, Internet fundraising does not require massive investments of
candidate time and thus allows candidates to direct attention to other matters,
like meeting with voters and discussing their campaign positions. 139 In addition,
which allowed the campaign to sponsor its own events and to begin to compile what ... [became] a list
of more than a half million e-mail addresses." Mark Singer, Running on Instinct, NEW YORKER, Jan. 12,
2004, at 43.
134. By the week after the New Hampshire primary, more than 189,100 supporters had signed up
on Meetup.com to attend a Dean meeting, more than 66,900 had signed up to attend a meeting for
Wesley Clark, and over 39,000 had signed up to attend a meeting for John Kerry. Meetup.com, at
http://www.meetup.com/browse/polact/cand/pres (last visited Feb. 6, 2004).
135. Samantha M. Shapiro, The Dean Connection, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2003, § 6, at 56 (describing
"Get Local," at Internet-based application used by the Dean campaign to help supporters get in touch
with one another, plan gatherings, and download customizable campaign materials); Jake Thompson,
Internet Changes the Way Candidates, Voters Interact, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Jan. 17, 2004, at 6A.
136. Some have referred to such Interet-based grassroots networking as "netrooting." See Carla
Marinucci, Lesser-Known Candidates Getting Word Out on the Net, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 5, 2003, at A3.
137. GRAEE BROWNING, ELECTRONIC DEMOCRACY: USING THE INTERNET TO TRANSFORM
AMERICAN POLITICS 158 (2d ed. 2002).
138. See, e.g., MICHAEL CORNFIELD & JONAH SIEGER, INST. FOR POL., DEMOCRACY, & THE
INTERNET, THE NET AND THE NOMINATION 6 (2003) ("[ln terms of 'cost per acquisition,' that is, the
average number of pennies the campaign must spend to get a donor dollar, the Internet is the most
efficient way to raise money."), available at http://www.ipdi.org/UploadedFiles/netnomination.pdf;
Bill Straub, Online Political Fund-raising Soars, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 1, 2000,
LEXIS, News & Business Library, Wire Service Stories File.
139. See Eve Gerber, Six Arguments for Online Fund Raising, SLATE, Jan. 19, 2000 ("E-fund-
raising enables candidates to cut down on the time-consuming ballroom speeches and the humiliating
spectacle of posing for pictures with wealthy donors."), at http://slate.msn.com/id/73270 (last visited
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because of the low costs of Internet fundraising, campaigns can efficiently use
it to raise low-dollar-value contributions. In contrast, the high cost of other
fundraising mechanisms, such as direct mail, telemarketing, or in-person
dinners, often make soliciting low-dollar-value contributions economically
unfeasible. This feature of the Internet, combined with the requirement that
candidates raise small contributions from many individual donors in order to
qualify for Trust Fund subsidies, should encourage a refocus on smaller donors.
Finally, fundraising over the physically boundless Intemet also makes raising
money from people located in places far away from the campaign and from
each other cost effective. In contrast, relying on traditional (in-person)
fundraising mechanisms to reach geographically dispersed potential donors
residing in lower density areas would be entirely cost-prohibitive for most
campaigns.
For precisely these reasons, the Dean presidential campaign relied on the
Internet for much of its fundraising. As Dean's campaign manager stated,
"[The Internet was] a major component of the campaign... particularly
because how we started out with less money and less money connections than
any of the other campaigns." 140 Based on its early, innovative, and aggressive
use of the Internet, the Dean campaign raised the most money of any of the
Democratic nominees for president and rejected federally offered matching
funds because of the $45 million cap on spending that acceptance of such funds
entails.14' Even after suffering significant electoral setbacks, the Dean
campaign continued to raise a steady stream of money over the Internet.1
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In sum, providing candidates funds for use on cable television and the
Intemet furthers the goals of increasing the informativeness and
competitiveness of modem campaigns. Because of the low cost of cable- and
Internet-based campaigning, candidates can disseminate substantially more
information using those media than if they relied on broadcast television, thus
increasing the quantity of information in a campaign. Additionally, the
inexpensiveness of the Internet greatly facilitates campaigns' organizational
and fundraising efforts, thus increasing the ability of resource-poor campaigns
to be competitive.
Mar. 22, 2004).
140. Tracy Schmaler, Net Gain: Dean Gets Online Boost, RUTLAND HERALD (Vt.), Apr. 19, 2003,
at Front Page, available at http://rutlandherald.nybor.com/News/Story/64121.html. In one quarter, Dean
raised $7 million online. Shapiro, supra note 135.
141. Francis X. Clines, The Doctor and the Net: His Bloggers and Donors Pursue Victory via the
Mouse, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2003, at A20.
142. Jodi Wilgoren & Adam Nagourney, Dean Says He'll Quit if He Doesn't Win Wisconsin, N.Y.




Another key advantage of both the Intemet and cable television is that they
allow campaigns to target messages to particular individuals, providing voters
with information that is more relevant to them and thus more valuable in
helping them make informed decisions about candidates as compared to
general, "broadcast" messages.
For many House (as well as some Senate) candidates, broadcast channels
reach an audience that is too expansive-it covers many people who do not
reside in their districts. 143 Cable, on the other hand, enables candidates to more
precisely channel their messages to individuals within their voting districts-to
be more "geoefficient," in the jargon of cable-television sales
representatives.144 This quality of cable television is not only important to a
candidates who represents a district that is within a large media market or
covers multiple media markets, but also to one seeking to direct a message to a
particular set of voters within her broad constituency.14  It may also prove
appealing to Senate and presidential candidates who are seeking to maximize
their resources or to better tailor messages to particular audiences.1
46
143. See, e.g., Billy Steinberg, Should You Buy Cable Spots in Local Races?, CAMPAIGNS &
ELECTIONS, Oct. 2001, at 48 (noting that "[o]ne-third of NYC's broadcast signal reaches much of New
Jersey, Connecticut and the counties up-state approaching Albany," meaning that many of the people
viewing political advertisements aimed at New Yorkers are not New York voters). As an indicative
example, consider the case of now-U.S. Senator Jon Corzine, who bought more time on New York
City's local stations to win his New Jersey seat that did Hillary Clinton and Rick Lazio combined. After
speculating that this caused confusion for voters in both New York and New Jersey, Sternberg observes
that "unlike Clinton and Lazio, Corzine's campaign had to do the same thing in Philadelphia, too. This is
despite the fact that cable's distribution includes every one of Jersey's 21 counties." Id. (emphasis
added).
144. See Jerry Hagstrom, Ad Attack, 24 NAT'L J. 810, 813 (1992) ("Cable TV sales representatives
argue that cable is 'geoefficient' and that politicians can use it to inexpensively target their message to
the most-receptive voters. Because they serve jurisdictions smaller than major metropolitan areas, cable
operators say, it's now possible for politicians---especially House candidates-who have found
television advertising too expensive to sell themselves on TV.").
145. Congressman Barney Frank's use of cable television to reach a particular community within
his district illustrates that medium's advantages. After a round of redistricting, Frank found himself
running against another incumbent in a district that including a city, Fall River, that had been
represented by his opponent for sixteen years. Frank's chances of district-wide victory depended on
winning a significant portion of the voters in Fall River, in which many Portuguese, senior citizens,
veterans, and working people resided. Frank could have bought advertising time on the Boston or
Providence broadcast networks to reach the people of Fall River, but doing so would have been very
expensive and would not have allowed him to target a messages to those voters. Instead, he bought
significantly cheaper time on the city's cable system and saturated it with programming and
advertisements specifically designed to appeal to Fall River's various groups. His strategy was a
resounding success-although he began the campaign as a two-to-one underdog in Fall River, he ended
up winning there by that margin and winning the overall election. See RICHARD ARMSTRONG, THE
NEXT HURRAH 165-73 (1988).
146. In addition to allowing targeting based on geography (by advertising on particular cable
systems), cable also facilitates advertising based on demographics (by advertising on national cable
networks). Different cable channels, such as Fox News, Lifetime, or MTV, tend to attract voters with
different demographic characteristics. Candidates have recently begun to take advantage of this unique
quality of cable networks. For instance, President George W. Bush's reelection campaign has targeted
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 22:351, 2004
Even more so than cable and other media typically used in campaigns, the
Internet enables candidates to send targeted messages to potential voters with
great precision. 147 This Intemet-based message targeting often occurs via e-
mail. By utilizing e-mail in tandem with a well-developed database-which can
be built through a registration feature on campaign websites, 148 by requesting
information from donors when they contribute online, 149 or by purchasing
complied lists from other sources-campaigns can send targeted messages to
specific audiences based on geographic location, demographic characteristics,
issue concerns, or multiple other criteria.' 50 E-mail can also serve as a means of
staying in contact with supporters and keeping them aware of developments at
times when the mass media is not paying much attention to a race in general or
to an individual campaign in particular. 15 1 In addition, e-mail constitutes a
particularly effective way for staying in contact with the media itself. A 2002
survey by the Pew Internet and American Life Project found that campaign
professionals believed that communicating with the media was one of the best
uses of the Internet.' 52 The 2000 Senate race between Hillary Clinton and Rick
Lazio offers an example of two campaigns that relied heavily on e-mail to
communicate with the press and to influence news coverage. 153 Similarly, both
male voters by advertising on such cable channels as The Golf Channel, Travel & Leisure, and CNBC.
See Jeff Zeleny, Politicians Tuning in to Voters' Favorite Shows, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 30, 2004, at Cl
("Bush was able to directly target his supporters by demographics, rather than geography, through
advertising on specialty cable channels."); see also Holly Yeager, Bush Team Uses Cable TV to Target
Specific Groups, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 17, 2004, at 10 ("[The Bush campaign] is using Speed
Channel and FX, both owned by Fox, to go after 'Nascar dads,' the stock-car racing fans who some
pollsters say could determine the winner of the election.").
147. One example of how the Intemet can be used for targeted advertising is evident in the recent
campaign for mayor of New York. Michael Bloomberg employed an innovative Intemet-based
advertising campaign that targeted readers of the New York Times website, http://www.nytimes.com,
based on zip code, which the New York Times collects when users register on the site. See Nicholas
Thompson, Machined Politics, WASH. MONTHLY, May 2002, at 31.
148. For instance, when visitors first entered Al Gore's website during the 2000 presidential
campaign, they were greeted by a brief form asking them to provide their e-mail address, zip code, and
home state. White, supra note 131.
149. When individuals make online contributions, campaigns can request that donors also provide
information that can then be used as part of its database compilation and e-mail targeting system.
CORNFIELD & SIEGER, supra note 138, at 6.
150. Id. atat4.
151. Cf id. at 16 (describing candidates' use of e-mails to supporters during the "virtual
primary"--the period lasting from the day after the last presidential election until the day before the first
primary for the next presidential election-to "draw attention to media coverage, influence online polls,
and encourage supporters to spread the word about the campaign.").
152. MICHAEL CORNFIELD & LEE RAINIE, INST. FOR POLITICS, DEMOCRACY, & INTERNET & PEW
INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, UNTUNED KEYBOARDS: ONLINE CAMPAIGNERS, CITIZENS, AND
PORTALS IN THE 2002 ELECTIONS 9 (2003), available at
http://www.pewintemet.org/reports/pdfs/PIPIPDIPoliticsReport.pdf.
153. Adam Nagoumey, Another Clinton War Room, Ready for Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2000,
at Al (noting that Mrs. Clinton's campaign employed "about a dozen people who research Mr. Lazio's
background and record, write Mrs. Clinton's policy pronouncements and, most important, seek to
influence the news coverage of Mrs. Clinton's campaign for Senate, mostly through an insistent barrage
of e-mail messages intended to advance the first lady and undercut Mr. Lazio").
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the Bush and Gore campaigns relied heavily on e-mail, often sending out
multiple e-mails per hour to the press) 54
Intemet-based communications also allow for a different type of message
targeting-time-based targeting. Unlike television advertising, regular mail,
and telemarketing-which usually only reach people in their homes-and
radio-which often reaches people only during their commutes-the Internet,
which more and more Americans use at work, often to check e-mail and to
engage in non-work-related surfing, is accessible to people throughout the
day.155 As a result, candidates can use the Internet not only to target specific
messages to particular voters, but also to target voters at times when they are
beyond the reach of other media.
In sum, the ability to individualize messages over nontraditional media both
increases the quality of information that voters receive and the overall
competitiveness of campaigns. By customizing messages for particular
audiences, campaigns can make those messages far more detailed and relevant
to voters than general advertisements distributed over broadcast media. In
addition, campaigns can use message targeting to communicate with important




The Internet allows for two types of interactivity-vertical and horizontal.
Vertical interactivity occurs when campaigns and voters interact directly in
two-way communication; horizontal interactivity occurs when supporters of a
campaign interact directly with one another without going through any
campaign-controlled intermediary. Some candidates have already begun to
exploit these specialized capabilities of the Internet, and their efforts indicate
how other federal candidates, with the help of the resources provided by the
Trust Fund, could utilize this medium to communicate with voters in a way and
to an extent that would otherwise be impossible. These examples demonstrate
how the Internet can increase both the quantity and quality of information
exchanged between candidates and voters during campaigns, improving
democratic discourse in the United States in the process.
154. Peter Marks, In Bush-Gore Race, 3 Words For Media: 'You've Got Mail,'N.Y. TIMES, June 1,
2000, at AI ("[J]ust as e-mail has ushered in a new era of epistolary ease and connectedness for the
world at large, it has also created a hyper-efficient form of press release, a paperless document that not
only links the political world to the nation's assignment editors, columnists and news anchors in
seconds, but also allows the campaigns to fire at each other at will, all day long.").
155. CORNFIELD & SIEGER, supra note 138, at 5, 28 fig.6.1.
156. See Sloan, supra note 122 ("Imagine the benefit of [targeting] for the Bush campaign or the
Democratic nominee. Concerned about 10 key states? Target a flood of online ads on the ZIP Codes and
demographic groups that may tip the balance there. Facing a gender gap? Target online ads directly on
the gender you're trying to reach.").
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Currently, the most frequently occurring form of vertical interactivity-
responding to emails sent by voters157-is also the most basic. However, far
more sophisticated possibilities exist. Lamar Alexander's 2002 Senate
campaign used a technology called "Groopz" which permitted visitors to
Alexander's website to have live chats with campaign staff and volunteers.
158
This type of interaction with voters would have been impossible via television,
radio, or other forms of media typically utilized by campaigns, and would have
been overwhelmingly time-consuming if done over the telephone. Although
this technology is not yet widely utilized, 159 the availability of Internet-specific
funds could provide the necessary catalyst for its more widespread adoption,
thus improving the dissemination of information that voters need to make
informed decisions about candidates.
The Internet can also transform typically static methods of reaching voters,
such as advertising, into vehicles for two-way communication. For instance,
online "click-through" ads can enable an interested viewer, if she chooses, to
sign-up for a campaign's mailing list, volunteer for a campaign, or contribute
money to a candidate, all at the click of a button. 1
60
The increasing use of blogs constitute another example of vertical
interactivity. Howard Dean spearheaded the use of blogs, or frequently updated
Internet-based journals, in campaigns. 16 1 After Dean launched his blog, six of
his eight rivals for the Democratic nomination, as well as President Bush, also
created blogs. 162 Blogs usually allow viewers to comment on posted material,
and they often permit candidates or campaign staff members to respond to these
comments. In doing so, they create an ongoing dialogue between voters and
campaigns, in which each can directly respond to the statements, questions, and
concerns of the other.
Blogs also allow for horizontal interactivity. Not only do individual blog
authors (or "bloggers") often allow readers to comment on their own postings,
but they also often link their websites to those of other bloggers and engage in
157. Cf CORNFIELD & RAINIE, supra note 152, at 9 (discussing the results of a survey of campaign
webmasters in which respondents described how incoming email is processed).
158. Nicholas Thompson, No, Really, This One's a Net Election, SLATE, Nov. 4, 2002, at
http://slate.msn.com/id/2073475 (last visited Mar. 22, 2004). The technology allowed staffers to respond
directly to voters' specific concerns, either by e-mailing back prepared texts, responding to questions
live, or "pushing" visitors to pages with relevant information. Id.
159. Only three percent of congressional campaign websites provided moderated discussion forums
in 2000, according to a study conducted by the Annenberg Public Policy Center. STEVEN M.
SCHNEIDER, ANNENBERG PUB. POLICY CTR., CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATE WEB SITES IN CAMPAIGN
2000: WHAT WEB ENTHUSIASTS WANTED, WHAT CANDIDATES PROVIDED 4 tbl.4 (2000).
160. See Schroeder, supra note 130.
161. One of the primary sites that provides the enabling software for blogs, Blogger.com, described
a blog as "a web page made up of usually short, frequently updated posts that are arranged
chronologically-like a what's new page or a journal." Blogger, About, at
http://www.blogger.com/about.pyra (last visited Mar. 22, 2004).
162. Brian Faler, Add 'Blog' to the Campaign Lexicon, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2003, at E4.
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ongoing exchanges with them.163 The Internet allows for horizontal
interactivity in other ways as well. Websites like Meetup.com have developed
with the specific intent of virtually connecting groups of individuals with
shared interests and then facilitating their physically meeting one another at
local venues-all without any organizational effort by central campaign
offices. 164
By greatly enhancing the ability of voters to communicate both with
candidates and with other citizens about political issues, these two forms of
interactivity not only increase the total amount of information people have
about campaigns, but also contribute to the functioning of our deliberative
democracy. In addition, horizontal interactivity removes a bottleneck found in
traditional models of organizing by empowering campaign supporters to
coordinate with one other without the assistance of the central campaign office,
thus increasing the ability of resource-poor campaigns to be competitive.
D. Immediacy
Not only does the Internet enable candidates to communicate directly with
voters and to engage in interactive dialogues with them, but it also liberates
them from the delays inherent in relying on other forms of media to reach
voters. Unlike television, radio, or billboards-advertisements on which must
be produced and procured in advance-or even direct mail-which must travel
through the postal system-the Internet allows for direct and immediate
communication, freeing candidates from the time delays imposed by relaying
their messages through the gatekeepers of other media.
Campaigns' greater utilization of blogs reflects the timing advantages of
Internet-based campaigning. Blog-pioneer Howard Dean used his blog to
provide a daily account of his activities, to offer discussions of his positions, to
alert readers to articles of interest in other publications, and, perhaps most
importantly, to respond immediately to breaking news or accusations. For
example, when a newspaper published an article suggesting that Dean changed
his position on the death penalty for political reasons, Dean utilized his blog to
quickly respond to the accusations.1 65 In addition to blogs, Internet-based
advertising can also be used by campaigns to get messages out quickly-either
to respond to opponents or to take advantage of recent events. 166 For instance,
President Bush's campaign used footage from an interview he had given on a
163. See A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.net: Toward a Critical Theory of
Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 860 & n.500 (2003).
164. See supra notes 133-136 and accompanying text.
165. Dean: Carpe Diem, HOTLINE, June 16,2003, LEXIS, News & Business Library, Hotline File.
166. Sloan, supra note 122 ("Online ads will be especially appealing to the political community
because they can be put up quickly and changed on the fly, even allowing a response in real time to
breaking news or an opposing candidate's charges.").
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Sunday-morning interview program in an Internet advertisement it distributed
two days later to promote his foreign policy programs. 
167
The immediacy of the Internet also offers advantages when it comes to
raising money. Internet-based fundraising can capture the enthusiasm of voters
following major events or victories in a manner that would be difficult with
other forms of raising funds. For example, when John McCain decisively won
the 2000 New Hampshire primary, he possessed an established website that
allowed those excited by his victory to immediately donate to his campaign.
168
Without the Internet, McCain's ability to exploit his victory for fundraising
purposes would have been severely diminished. 169 Similarly, Senators John
Kerry and John Edwards utilized Internet fundraising to capitalize on the
excitement surrounding their strong finishes in the Iowa caucuses in January
2004.170 In March 2004, in the twenty-four-hour period after he had effectively
secured the Democratic nomination, Senator Kerry raised a record amount of
money, $1.2 million, in contributions over the Internet.'77
The timing advantages of the Internet can also have a major impact on
mobilizing supporters on election day. During the 2002 Democratic
gubernatorial primary in Illinois, Rod Blagojevich utilized a sophisticated
Internet-based get-out-the-vote operation to achieve his narrow victory; this
maneuver would have been impossible had his campaign been forced to rely on
traditional methods of mobilization. 172 Jean Carnahan's win in the 2000
Missouri Senate race also depended on Internet-based get-out-the-vote
efforts, 173 and Mark Warner's strong victory in the 2001 Virginia gubernatorial
election relied in part on a similar operation. 174 During the 2002 elections,
Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert organized an "online 72-hour strike
167. Elizabeth Jensen, Bush Ad Excerpt Rankles NBC News, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2004, at A22.
168. After McCain won the primary, people began contributing to his campaign over the Internet
at the rate of $30,000 per hour; four days later, McCain's Internet donations totaled over $2 million.
CORNFIELD & SIEGER, supra note 138, at 10-11.
169. Jeremy Derfher, So, Was It a Net Election?, SLATE, Jan. 26, 2001 ("Although he eventually
lost to Bush in South Carolina, the Web harnessed McCain's New Hampshire momentum, which might
otherwise have dissipated in an underfunded ground operation."), at http://slate.msn.com/id/97767 (last
visited Mar. 22, 2004).
170. See Julia Malone, Iowa Surge for Kerry and Edwards Yields Campaign Cash, Cox NEWS
SERVICE, Jan. 22, 2004, LEXIS, News & Business Library, Wire Service Stories File; All Things
Considered (NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 20, 2004).
171. Mark Z. Barabak & Maria L. La Ganga, Bush-Kerry Fight Off to Quick Start, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 4, 2004, at Al.
172. See Thompson, supra note 147, at 27. On election day, Blagojevich's campaign regularly
monitored voter turnout at 350 "indicator precincts" across the state. If turnout was low in a county that
the campaign expected to win, it immediately mobilized local volunteers to engage in traditional get-
out-the-vote activities, such as going door-to-door and contacting likely voters. As Thompson
concludes: "[T]he campaign [theoretically] could have done the same sort of compiling before the
Internet, with pen, paper, and calculators. It just would have taken several days-by which time their
candidate would have been home eating cold soup." Id.
173. Id. at 29-30.
174. Id. at 31.
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force" designed to rally voters electronically. 175 Each of these campaigns'
reliance on the Internet for increasing turnout on election day demonstrates the
powerful impact that the Internet can have on elections-and provides a
glimpse of how savvy candidates could utilize Trust Fund money to increase
the competitiveness of future campaigns.
Unlike previously proposed free air time plans, the Proposal does not
merely assist candidates with campaign activities on which they already rely-
namely, advertising on broadcast television-but also seeks to shape their
overall approach to campaigning in a way that should benefit both their
candidacies individually as well as the operation of the democratic process as a
whole. Through its provision of Internet-specific funds, the Proposal places
special emphasis on the increased use of a medium not traditionally used by
candidates, but one that is particularly useful for addressing many of the
problems of modem campaigns. Given the unique qualities of the Internet, its
more widespread use would both increase the quantity and quality of
information disseminated in campaigns-improving the ability of voters to
make decisions within the democratic process-and also increase electoral
competitiveness by facilitating the ability of less well-funded candidates to
engage in certain key campaign activities, such as engaging in meaningful
communication with voters, organizing and mobilizing supporters, and raising
campaign funds. Although the Internet will probably never replace traditional
methods of campaigning, it can supplement them in beneficial ways. By
including resources specifically designated for Internet-related campaigning,
the Proposal reconceptualizes what can be accomplished by a free air time plan.
VI. THE LAW: WHY THE PROPOSAL IS CONSTITUTIONAL
The Proposal offered by this Note likely would be subject to numerous
legal challenges. Broadcast and cable operators may claim that various
elements of the Proposal amount to a taking in violation of their Fifth
Amendment rights as well as violate their First Amendment rights of free
speech and association. This Part reviews these possible grounds for challenge
and concludes that the Proposal would survive constitutional scrutiny. These
issues are obviously complex and implicate some complicated areas of law,
making a comprehensive examination of these legal concerns beyond the scope
of this Note. As a result, the Note merely provides a brief overview of these
matters in order to highlight the relevant issues and to suggest why the Proposal
would survive legal scrutiny.
175. Thompson, supra note 158.
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A. The Spectrum Use Fee, Reasonable Access Rules, and Revised Lowest
Unit Charge Rule Do Not Amount to a "Taking" Under the Fifth
Amendment
Broadcasters will likely claim that the spectrum use fee and the revised
lowest unit charge rule included in the Proposal amount to takings of their
property without just compensation, which is prohibited by the Fifth
Amendment. However, under the Communications Act of 1934 and relevant
case law, such a takings challenge has no validity. Section 304 of the Act
requires broadcast license applicants to "waive[] any claim to the use of any
particular frequency or of the electromagnetic spectrum as against the
regulatory power of the United States because of the previous use of the same,
whether by license or otherwise."' 76 The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that
this section of the Act clearly indicates Congress's intent that "no person is to
have anything in the nature of a property right as a result of the granting of a
license.", 77
Although the government has not chosen to charge broadcasters a fee for
using their licenses in the past, nothing prevents it from assessing such a "rental
charge" in the future.' 78 In fact, in its 2004 budget, the Bush administration
included billions of dollars in projected rent charges for broadcasters'
occupation of both the analog and digital spectrums after 2006.179 Nor does the
imposition of a spectrum use fee necessarily relieve broadcasters of their public
interest obligations. Congress or the FCC can adjust the requirements of a
license without forfeiting its ability to impose public interest obligations on
license holders. For instance, the federal government charges satellite
broadcasting companies billions of dollars for their spectrum licenses (which
were assigned by auction), yet still requires satellite television providers to set
aside space for public services.' Furthermore, the use of money raised from
176. 47 U.S.C. § 304 (2000).
177. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940); see also Ashbacker Radio
Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 331 (1945).
178. See 47 U.S.C. § 316(a)(1) (2000) ("Any station license or construction permit may be
modified by the [FCC] either for a limited time or for the duration of the term thereof, if in the judgment
of the Commission such action will promote the public interest, convenience, and necessity .... ").
179. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 92 tbl.5-3, 94 (2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/pdf/spec.pdf.
180. 47 U.S.C. § 335 (2000); see also TAYLOR & ORNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 8 (describing how
satellite television providers are required "to submit to govemment regulation and provide space for
other public purposes" even though they paid large sums for their spectrum licenses). While not
proposing a free air time proposal per se, some commentators have suggested that all of broadcast
stations' public interest obligations, including the lowest unit charge rules, should be replaced by a five
percent spectrum fee that could fund measures such as the Trust Fund. See, e.g., HENRY GELLER & TIM
WATTS, THE FIVE PERCENT SOLUTION: A SPECTRUM FEE TO REPLACE THE 'PUBLIC INTEREST
OBLIGATIONS' OF BROADCASTERS 12 (New America Foundation, Spectrum Series Working Paper No.
3, 2002), available at http://www.newamerica.netiDownloadDocs/pdfs/PubFile844 1.pdf. However,
addressing the negative impact of broadcast advertising on the costs of campaigns requires not only
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the spectrum use fee to fund communication activities on non-broadcast media
does not strengthen the broadcasters' takings claim. Congress is free to earmark
funds it raises for any purpose it wishes. 181 Therefore, the imposition by
Congress of new conditions on broadcasters' licenses does not amount to a
taking because broadcasters have no property interest in their licenses.
82
The takings issue with regard to cable operators is different in two ways,
but the validity of such a takings claim is equally doubtful. First, there is no
federal law that conditions cable companies' operation on a waiver of any
asserted property interest in cable air time, nor has the Supreme Court ruled on
this issue. Second, the cable companies' takings claim would not be based on
the imposition of a fee, but would rather be limited to the issue of whether the
reasonable access and lowest unit charge rules constitute a taking. The cable
companies would likely claim that by requiring them to sell advertising time at
reduced rates to political candidates, the Proposal upsets their investment-
backed expectation to sell available advertising time to the highest bidders.
Even assuming that cable companies have a property right over their air time,
case law indicates that the Proposal does not constitute a regulatory taking.
Because cable stations would still be compensated for their time under the
Proposal, albeit at the lowest unit charge rate, the Proposal could only be
construed as a partial, rather than complete, taking. However, the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence makes it clear that a regulation that substantially
diminishes the value of an owner's property does not constitute a taking as long
as that regulation serves a government interest of comparative significance.'
83
providing candidates with resources to fund campaign activities, but also ensuring that these funds can
be used to buy reasonably priced advertising time. Any effective reform must ensure that the provision
of advertising subsidies does not create inflationary pressure on the price of advertising, with broadcast
stations simply raising their prices to capture the value of this additional resource. Furthermore, other
aspects of broadcasters' public interest obligations, including the reasonable access rules and the
obligations related to children's programming, are important and would be lost if a spectrum fee
replaced all of the public interest obligations of broadcasters. Instead of "the five percent solution," the
imposition of a smaller fee along with the retention of the various public interest obligations, both those
relating to political campaigns and those furthering to other purposes, represents a superior course of
action.
181. See id. at 12-13 (discussing potential uses for the proceeds from a spectrum fee assessed
against broadcasters, including the possibility of funding a "Digital Opportunity Investment Trust,"
which would "support innovative uses of digital technology for education, lifelong learning, and the
transformation of our civic and cultural institutions").
182. See supra notes 176-178 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Hundt, supra note 37, at 1109
("[U]nder the Communications Act it is crystal clear that broadcast licensees have no property claim to
the airwaves or to a particular frequency. Takings claims are fatally undermined by this fact." (footnotes
omitted)); Levinson, supra note 94, at 172-76 (addressing and refuting broadcasters' arguments that free
air time measures constitute an unconstitutional taking without just compensation).
183. Although there is no "set formula" for evaluating whether a regulatory taking has occurred-
courts instead utilize "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries," Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S 104, 131 (1978)-the Supreme Court has regularly held that a regulation can substantially
diminish the value of a property without constituting a taking. See generally id. (noting that "diminution
in property value, standing alone," does not establish a taking but that the issue "is resolved by focusing
on the uses the regulations permit"); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
(sustaining a zoning regulation even though it resulted in a seventy-five percent diminution in the value
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The government interest in these measures-improving the proper operation of
the democratic process-is undeniably substantial. 84 Therefore, even if one
accepts that cable companies have a property interest in their air time, the fact
that the regulation results in a diminution of its value does not make it an
unconstitutional taking.
B. The Revised Lowest Unit Charge and Existing Reasonable Access Rules
Do Not Violate Broadcasters'First Amendment Rights
The imposition of the revised lowest unit charge and existing reasonable
access rules on broadcasters is constitutional under the First Amendment. The
Communications Act of 1934 grants the FCC the ability "as public
convenience, interest, or necessity requires ... [to m]ake such rules and
regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with
law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act .... ,185 In
assessing the ability of the federal government to impose obligations on
broadcasters under this section of the Act, the Supreme Court has recognized
that broadcasters are entitled to less First Amendment protection than other
media. In NBC v. United States,' 86 the Court articulated the differences between
the First Amendment rights of broadcasters and those of other media. Because
of the scarcity of the spectrum, which limits the number of people who can
engage in broadcasting, the Court held that the federal government possesses a
legitimate interest in creating a licensing system to ensure that the spectrum is
used effectively-both technically and in furtherance of the public interest.
187
As a result, the Court concluded that the First Amendment allows the federal
government to exercise broad discretion in regulating broadcasters as part of its
efforts to guarantee the spectrum is used in the public interest.
188
In the landmark case of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,189 the Court
strongly affirmed the ability of the federal government to impose certain types
of content-based regulations on broadcasters by focusing on the First
Amendment rights of the audience rather than those of the broadcasters. As the
Court stated, "No one has a First Amendment right to a license or to
monopolize a radio frequency .... It is the right of the viewers and listeners,
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. ' 90 Referring to the
of an owner's property); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding an ordinance despite
at least 87.5 percent diminution in value).
184. See, e.g., infra notes 197-203 and accompanying text.
185. 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (2000).
186, 319 U.S. 190 (1943)
187. Id.
188. Id. at 226-27.
189. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
190. Id. at 389-90.
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scarcity of the broadcast spectrum, the Court later noted that "[i]t does not
violate the First Amendment to treat licensees .. as proxies for the entire
community, obligated to give suitable time and attention to matters of great
public concern." 191  Although some Justices,'
92  lower courts, 193
commentators, 194 and, unsurprisingly, the broadcast industry itself1 95 have
questioned the ongoing validity of the scarcity rationale as a justification for
lesser First Amendment protection for broadcasters, the Supreme Court
continues to uphold it. In 1994, in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC
(Turner I), the Court stated: "Although courts and commentators have
criticized the scarcity rationale since its inception, we have declined to question
its continuing validity as support for our broadcast jurisprudence... and see no
reason to do so here."
'1 96
Therefore, any evaluation of obligations imposed on broadcasters must take
into account the First Amendment rights of listeners or viewers, and these First
Amendment interests are particularly strong in matters relating to campaign
speech. The Court has stated that the First Amendment "has its fullest and most
urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office"
'1 97
and that "speech concerning public affairs is ... the essence of self-
government."' 98 Furthermore, it has explained that "it is of particular
importance that candidates have the unfettered opportunity to make their views
known so that the electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates' personal
qualities and their positions on vital public issues before choosing among them
on election day."
'1 99
As a result, the Supreme Court has granted Congress and the FCC wide
discretion in imposing requirements on broadcasters as part of their public
interest obligations, particularly when these requirements relate to campaign
speech. For instance, in Red Lion, the Court upheld the "Fairness Doctrine,"
191. Id. at394.
192. See, e.g., CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 144 (Stewart, J. concurring); id. at
158 n.8 (Douglas, J., concurring).
193. See, e.g., Action for Children's Television v. FCC (Act III), 58 F.3d 654, 673-76 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (Edwards, C.J., dissenting); Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
194. See, e.g., Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast
Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 221-30 (1982); Douglas C. Melcher, Note, Free Air Time for Political
Advertising: An Invasion of the Protected First Amendment Freedoms of Broadcasters, 67 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 100, 114-19 (1998).
195. See, e.g., P. CAMERON DEVORE, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERALLY MANDATED
"FREE AIR TIME" (1998) (outlining the National Association of Broadcasters' arguments against the
constitutionality of free air times proposals, as submitted to the Presidential Advisory Committee on
Public Interest Obligations of Digital Television Broadcasters), at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/pubintadvcom/marchmtg/DeVore.htm (Mar. 2, 1998).
196. 512 U.S. 622, 638 (1994) (footnote omitted).
197. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971),
198. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
199. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52-53 (1976).
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which required broadcasters to give candidates a right of reply when they were
criticized on air.200 In CBS v. FCC, the Court upheld a law requiring
broadcasters to provide legally qualified candidates reasonable access to their
airwaves. 2° 1 As part of its ruling, the Court noted that the reasonable access
provision of the Communications Act of 1934 "enhanc[es] the ability of
candidates to present, and the public to receive, information necessary for the
effective operation of the democratic process" and thus "properly balances the
First Amendment rights of federal candidates, the public, and broadcasters.
' 20 2
Likewise, in upholding the equal time requirements in Farmers Educational &
Cooperative Union v. WDAY, the Court recognized that the purpose of those
requirements was to "facilitate political debate over radio and television."
20 3
This line of cases, and the rationale that they employ, indicate that the
reasonable access and revised lowest unit charge rules contained in the
Proposal would withstand constitutional challenge. Both rules are
manifestations of a long-upheld power of the federal government to regulate
broadcasters to advance voters' ability to receive political speech. The rules
guaranteeing reasonable access to broadcast stations-which remain unchanged
in the Proposal-have already been upheld by the Court.204 Like the reasonable
access rules, the revised lowest unit charge rules are also a valid congressional
imposition of public interest obligations on broadcasters. These rules improve
the ability of candidates to communicate with voters by increasing the
accessibility of the airwaves, and hence serve to "promote free speech
principles by facilitating a better informed electorate and the more effective
operation of the democratic process.,
205
200. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
201. 453 U.S. 367 (1981). In contrast, in CBS v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94
(1973), the Court struck down a rule requiring stations to accept paid editorial advertisements. Thus,
these two decisions indicate the solicitude that the Court grants restrictions on broadcasters specifically
designed to promote candidate speech.
202. 453 U.S. at 396-97.
203. 360 U.S. 525, 534 (1959).
204. See supra notes 201-202 and accompanying text.
205. ANGLE A. WELBORN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF TORRICELLI
AMENDMENT TO THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT OF 2001 (2001) (analyzing the
constitutionality of the Torricelli Amendment, upon which the Proposal's revision of the lowest unit
charge is based), reprinted in ALLIANCE FOR BETTER CAMPAIGNS, LOWEST UNIT CHARGE: COMBATING
THE BROADCAST INDUSTRY'S MISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN (2001), at
http://www.bettercampaigns.org/reports/display.php?PagelD=5 (last visited Mar. 22, 2004); see also
Memorandum from Elizabeth Daniel, Brennan Center for Justice, The Lowest Unit Charge Amendment
to McCain-Feingold is Constitutional (May 10, 2001) (stating that the Torricelli Amendment "is not
only constitutional, it furthers important First Amendment values vital to a vibrant democracy"),




C. The Revised Lowest Unit Charge and Reasonable Access Rules Do Not
Violate Cable System Operators' First Amendment Rights
Although cable operators receive greater First Amendment protection than
broadcasters, recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that content-neutral
regulations of cable, such as the ones contained in the Proposal, can be upheld
under an intermediate scrutiny standard. In Turner I, the Court specifically
declined to apply the same First Amendment standard to cable as it did to
broadcast because the scarcity rationale does not apply to the former.
206
However, the Court also rejected the proposition that all regulations of cable
merit strict scrutiny review. It stated that laws that are "speaker partial" are not
presumptively invalid; rather, these laws only require strict scrutiny when "they
reflect the Government's preference for the substance of what the favored
speakers have to say (or aversion to what the disfavored speakers have to
,,207say). Thus, the fact that a law prefers certain speakers over others does not
necessarily demand strict scrutiny review.
In applying these principles to the "must carry" regulations at issue in
Turner I, which require cable system operators to carry certain broadcast
stations, the Court stated that the broad applicability of the regulations-that is,
the fact that they apply to almost all cable systems-indicates that they are not
"structured in a manner that carries the inherent risk of undermining First
Amendment interests." 2° 8 Although "the provisions interfere with cable
operators' editorial discretion," strict scrutiny was not warranted due to the fact
that "the extent of the interference does not depend upon the content of the
cable operators' programming." 20 9 Furthermore, the structure of the regulations
does not allow "an operator [to] avoid or mitigate its obligations under the Act
by altering the programming it offers to subscribers." 210 The Court thus
concluded that the regulations were content neutral and subject to intermediate
scrutiny.2 11 The case was remanded to determine if the economic rationale cited
206. 512 U.S. at 637-39.
207. Id. at 658 (citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983)).
208. Id. at 661. The Court cited Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991), as an example of
another regulation it upheld because its wide applicability indicated that there was not a sufficient threat
to First Amendment freedoms to merit strict scrutiny. In Leathers, the Court upheld a state sales tax
applicable to many cable systems "offering a wide variety of programming" because the tax was not
"likely to stifle the free exchange of ideas." Id. at 449, 453. The Court contrasted this sales tax and the
Turner I "must carry" regulations with those it invalidated in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.
Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983), and Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v.
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987). These latter regulations, the Court stated, were far more narrowly
focused on a small number of speakers, risking much greater danger of government suppression of
ideas. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 659-61.
209. Id. at 643-44.
210. Id. This differentiated the "must-carry" regulations from the right-of-reply rules at issue in
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). For a more complete discussion of the
differences between these two regulations, see infra notes 223-225 and accompanying text.
211. 512 U.S. at 662 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), for the applicable
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by the government justified the regulation under the intermediate scrutiny
standard.
When the case returned to the Court in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
FCC (Turner II), the Court upheld the constitutionality of the "must carry"
212provisions under the intermediate scrutiny standard. The Court stated again
that "a content-neutral regulation will be sustained under the First Amendment
if it advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of
free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to
further those interests." 213 In determining that the governmental interest cited in
this case was important, the Court, like the district court, based its decision on
the extensive factual record that had been developed on remand, which
contained substantial evidence supporting Congress's judgment that the
regulations furthered important governmental interests and were narrowly
tailored to promote those interests. In its ruling, the Court emphasized that it
owes Congress's findings deference because of the latter branch's particular
competence to analyze the large amounts of evidence relating to legislative
questions. 214 It noted that this deference applies even in regard to regulatory
policies implicating First Amendment interests. 215 As a result, under the
Court's decisions in Turner I and Turner II, even speaker-partial regulations of
cable operators will be considered content neutral and thus evaluated under an
intermediate scrutiny standard as long as they do not evince a preference for
216
what the favored speakers have to say.
Based on the Turner model of First Amendment analysis for regulations of
cable operators, the reasonable access and lowest unit charge provisions of the
Proposal would withstand constitutional scrutiny. The Turner model dictates
that intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard to apply to the reasonable
access and lowest unit charge provisions. The Court's decisions indicate that
these provisions' partiality to a particular type of speaker-political
candidates-does not necessarily require the application of strict scrutiny
because these provisions do not reflect a preference for the substance of what
the favored speakers have to say. Any candidate who qualifies under the
standard for evaluating content-neutral regulations). Under the O'Brien standard, a content-neutral law
will be sustained if "it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." 391 U.S. at 377.
212. 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
213. Id. at 189.
214. Id. at 195.
215. Id. at 196.
216. An example of the application of the Turner principles to other forms of cable regulation
beside "must carry" provisions can be found in Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC (Time Warner
1), 56 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Relying on Turner 1, the D.C. Circuit found that cable rate regulations




Proposal, whether a Republican, Democratic, or member of a third party,
receives the benefits of these provisions. In addition, the structure of the
reasonable access and lowest unit charge rules indicates they do not pose
inherent dangers to free expression. They do not single out particular cable
operators or programmers, but rather are universally applied. Although these
provisions interfere to some extent with cable operators' editorial discretion,
the extent of this interference does not depend on the cable operators'
programming, and cable operators can not mitigate their obligation by altering
their programming. Moreover, the provisions impose merely an incidental
burden on cable operators' speech. Although the regulations require cable
operators to allow candidates to advertise and pay reasonable rates, they do not
in any way impact cable operators' programming decisions. All of these factors
indicate that the reasonable access and lowest unit charge provisions as applied
to cable operators are content-neutral regulations for which an intermediate
level of scrutiny is the proper standard of review.
The application of the intermediate level of scrutiny to these provisions
clearly demonstrates their constitutionality. As the Court stated, a content-
neutral regulation "will be sustained under the First Amendment if it advances
important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech
and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those
interests." 217 The provisions further an important governmental interest:
facilitating the operation of the democratic process both by increasing the
dissemination of political information that voters require to make decisions and
by enhancing the competitiveness of campaigns. The Supreme Court
recognized the importance of this interest in Buckley and other cases.218 In
addition, this interest is unrelated to the suppression of free speech-in fact, the
Proposal is intended to increase the quantity and quality of speech
disseminated through various campaign media. Moreover, the reasonable
access and lowest unit charge rules are narrowly tailored to achieve the
Proposal's goals, properly balancing the government's interest in a robust
deliberative democracy with the speech rights of cable operators. These
regulations only apply during the most critical periods for campaigns-forty-
five days before a primary election and sixty days before a general election.
They also only affect cable advertising, leaving cable operators' programming
decisions entirely up to them. Finally, in order for the provisions to pass
constitutional muster under the intermediate scrutiny standard, the Turner
decisions indicate Congress must develop a factual record to support its
judgment that the regulations further important governmental interest and are
narrowly tailored to promote those interests. Based on the multiple
217. Turner If, 520 U.S. at 189.
218. See supra notes 197-203.
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Congressional investigations into these and related issues, developing such a
record should pose no difficulty.
219
The constitutionality of the reasonable access provision is not compromised
when applied to a cable station dedicated to a particular point of view. Some
cable channels engage in programming that promotes specific religious views
or political beliefs. Under the Proposal, these channels would be required to run
advertisements by all candidates, including those who promote views
antithetical to their own. Nonetheless, the Court's decisions indicate that the
Proposal's reasonable access requirement would still survive constitutional
challenge, whether on compelled speech or expressive association grounds.
As a threshold matter, the Court has upheld numerous content-neutral
regulations despite their negative impact on protected political or religious
speech. 220 The fact that a regulation impedes or otherwise affects an entity's
ability to engage in protected speech does not constitute sufficient grounds to
invalidate the regulation as long as it is content neutral. Thus, even if a specific
cable station can show that the Proposal's reasonable access provision
interferes with its ability to communicate its viewpoint, that alone will not be
enough to sustain a constitutional challenge to the regulation.
A cable station that promotes a particular viewpoint may claim that the
reasonable access provision constitutes impermissibly compelled speech, but
this argument would likely fail. In the realm of media structural regulation, the
Court has upheld numerous content-neutral laws that require media entities to
allow others to use their facilities, even if this use by outsiders might conflict
with the media entities' own message and even though it has invalidated
analogous measures when applied to individuals or other associations. 22' The
Court's decisions reveal the extent to which the government may mandate
outsider access to media. In Turner I, the Court explicitly delineated the
differences between acceptable and unacceptable mandated-access measures by
contrasting the "must-carry" rules it upheld in that case with the measures it
struck down in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of
California222 and Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.223 First, unlike the
219. See, e.g., CANTOR ET AL., supra note 2 (discussing congressional proposals, hearings, and
other activity on these and related issues throughout the years); see also 147 CONG. REc. S2603-18
(daily ed. Mar. 21, 2001) (Senate debate on Torricelli Amendment); 148 CONG. REC. H417-20 (daily ed.
Feb. 13, 2002) (House debate on Torricelli Amendment).
220. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649
(1981); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
221. See C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REv. 891, 933
(2002) (citing as examples Turner 1], 520 U.S. at 180; Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc.
v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996); CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981); and Red Lion Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)). Baker suggests a rationale for the Court's apparently dichotomous
approach: Since none of these cases involved any censorship, the Court approved compelled speech in
order to "to improve the overall communications environment in relation to a free press," an important
interest that is lacking in analogous cases involving compelled individual speech. Id. at 938.
222. 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (involving a rule that required a private utility to include in its monthly bills
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content-neutral "must-carry" rules, the access rights in Tornillo and Pacific Gas
& Electric were only triggered when the regulated entities engaged in specific
224
content-based speech. Second, unlike the regulations invalidated in these two
cases, the access rights granted to broadcasters by the "must-carry" rules could
not be diminished if the regulated cable entities changed the content of their
speech; as a result, the regulations did not provide cable companies an
incentive to reduce their speech in order to avoid triggering access rights.
225
Like the "must-carry" rules at issue in Turner I, the reasonable access rights
guaranteed to political candidates under the Proposal are also within the bounds
of permissible government regulation of the media. First, the access rights are
not content based, but rather allow candidates access to cable advertising time
regardless of any individual cable station's message. Second, the access rights
cannot be diminished if the regulated cable stations change the content of their
messages or alter their specific viewpoints. As a result, the Proposal's
reasonable access provision would survive a challenge based on the compelled
speech doctrine.
A cable station with a distinctive political or social message may alternately
claim that, based upon its right to expressive association, it is constitutionally
impermissible to force it to associate its content with commercials promoting
views contrary to its own. However, this claim would likely also fail. Courts
have historically failed to grant expressive association protections to the
press.226 However, even if a cable station could be considered an "expressive
association" and receive all of the concomitant rights and protections, the
reasonable access rules would still survive constitutional scrutiny. In Boy
Scouts of American v. Dale, the Court explained that entities entitled to
expressive association rights can nonetheless be subjected to measures that
impede those rights if they are "adopted to serve compelling state interests,
unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means
,,227significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms. As discussed above,
each quarter a newsletter published by a consumer group critical of its policies).
223. 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (involving a right-of-reply statute that allowed political candidates to
receive space in a newspaper, free of charge, whenever the newspaper included content critical of their
character).
224. Turnerl, 512 U.S. at 655-56.
225. Id. at 656.
226. See Christopher R. Edgar, Note, The Right to Freedom of Expressive Association and the
Press, 55 STAN. L. REV. 191, 233-34 (2002) ("[C]ourts have historically refused to apply the [expressive
associations] balancing test when faced with similar claims by press entities. Instead, courts have almost
uniformly dismissed such claims on the ground that a press entity is not entitled to a special exemption
from content-neutral governmental actions."); see also Reporters' Comm. for Freedom of the Press v.
AT&T, 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (rejecting reporters' argument that they should not be required
to turn over subpoenaed phone records containing conversations with sources under a freedom of
association theory).
227. 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
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the reasonable access rules meet all these criteria.228 Thus, even if the Proposal
required a cable station with a particular point of view to run an advertisement
by a candidate whose views were antithetical to its own, it would not be found
to be unconstitutional under the freedom of expressive association doctrine.
VII. CONCLUSION
The single most important quality a candidate must possess to have any
chance of electoral success should not be access to money. But that describes
today's reality. As television broadcast stations-the primary source through
which Americans receive their news--continually reduce their coverage of
campaigns, candidates must depend on increasingly expensive television
advertisements to reach voters. The answer to this problem, however, is not
reducing the amount of money in politics-it is pumping more money into
campaigns. In the thirty years since the enactment of the Watergate-era reform
measures, it has become clear that money will always find its way around the
rules and into the campaign system, despite efforts to ban it-a point made by
the Supreme Court in its recent decision in the campaign finance reform case,
McConnell v. FEC.229 Thus, the solution to the problems facing modem
campaigns lies not in attempting to limit better-funded candidates' abilities to
spend the money that they can access, but rather in providing resources to those
less well-funded candidates who would otherwise have no access to money on
their own. By arming such challengers with enough resources to make voters
aware of their existence and to get out their messages, the Proposal outlined in
this Note should not only increase the number of choices available to voters,
but should also provide them with the information required to make meaningful
decisions in elections-both of which are essential to the functioning of real
democracy. In addition, by incentivizing candidate use of media not typically
used in campaigns, such as the Intemet and cable television, the Proposal seeks
both to break the stranglehold of broadcast television advertising while also
advancing media that are particularly conducive to fostering a robust discourse
between candidates and voters.
Today, the democratic process in the United States is broken-but it is not
beyond repair. This Note's Proposal constitutes a critical first step in the long
process of fixing it.
228. See supra notes 206-219 and accompanying text.
229. 124 S Ct. 619 (2003). The Court's opinion, written by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, stated,
"We are under no illusion that [the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA)] will be the last
congressional statement on the matter. Money, like water, will always find an outlet." Id. at 706. See
also Nick Anderson & Janet Hook, Big Money's Spigot Will Stay Open, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2003, at 1
("[A]s opponents of [the BCRA] predicted, much of that [banned] money is finding its way back into the
political system through other means.").
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